To amend section 10 (1) (c) of article V of the constitution; Relating to: prohibiting the governor from using the partial veto to create or increase any tax or fee (second consideration).
Impact
If AJR127 is enacted, it would have a profound impact on how financial legislation is handled at the state level. By preventing the governor from unilaterally imposing new taxes or fees through the partial veto, the amendment could alter legislative dynamics significantly. It places a firmer check on executive power, ensuring that any tax-related changes would require explicit legislative approval, thereby reinforcing the legislative body's authority in financial matters. This could lead to increased legislative debates over taxation policies and potentially delay the implementation of necessary fiscal measures during budget discussions.
Summary
Assembly Joint Resolution 127 (AJR127) proposes a significant constitutional amendment aimed at restricting the powers of the governor concerning the partial veto. Specifically, the bill seeks to prohibit the governor from creating, increasing, or authorizing any new taxes or fees while exercising this veto power. This proposed amendment would add to the existing limitations on the governor's ability to modify appropriation bills, effectively tightening the rules governing fiscal matters in state legislation.
Contention
The proposed amendment is not without controversy. Proponents argue that it fosters transparency and fairness in fiscal policy, ensuring that tax changes are openly debated and approved by the elected legislature rather than being subject to executive discretion. However, opponents contend that the amendment could hinder the governor's ability to respond swiftly to urgent fiscal needs, particularly in times of economic crisis. They fear that this could lead to a lack of flexibility in governance and may perpetuate gridlock in legislative processes concerning finance.
A concurrent resolution to amend and reenact section 9 of article III and section 16 of article IV of the Constitution of North Dakota, relating to the threshold for approving a constitutional amendment.
Proposing An Amendment To Article Vi, Section 3, Of The Hawaii State Constitution To Increase The Mandatory Retirement Age For State Justices And Judges.
Proposing An Amendment To Article Vi, Section 3, Of The Hawaii State Constitution To Increase The Mandatory Retirement Age For State Justices And Judges.
Applying to the Congress of the United States to call a convention under Article V of the United States Constitution for the limited purpose of proposing one or more amendments to the constitution to impose fiscal restraints on the federal government, to limit the power and jurisdiction of the federal government, and to limit the terms of office of federal officials and members of Congress.
Applying to the Congress of the United States to call a convention under Article V of the United States Constitution for the limited purpose of proposing one or more amendments to the constitution to impose fiscal restraints on the federal government, to limit the power and jurisdiction of the federal government, and to limit the terms of office of federal officials and members of Congress.
Proposing An Amendment To Article Xvii, Section 3 Of The Hawaii Constitution To Specify That The Standard For Voter Approval Of A Constitutional Amendment Proposed By The Legislature Is A Majority Of All The Votes Tallied Upon The Question.
Proposing An Amendment To Article Xvii, Section 3 Of The Hawaii Constitution To Specify That The Standard For Voter Approval Of A Constitutional Amendment Proposed By The Legislature Is A Majority Of All The Votes Tallied Upon The Question.
Proposing An Amendment To Article Xvii, Section 3 Of The Hawaii State Constitution To Specify That The Standard For Voter Approval Of A Constitutional Amendment Proposed By The Legislature Is A Majority Of All The Votes Tallied Upon The Question.