SB 60, the “Write the Laws Act,” would sharply restrict federal lawmaking by prohibiting Congress from delegating legislative power to the executive branch, the judiciary, agencies, states, or private parties. The bill defines prohibited delegation broadly to include the creation or clarification of criminal or civil offenses and most public-facing regulations unless those rules are fully and completely defined in an Act of Congress. It also limits new presidential directives, adjudicative decisions, rules, and regulations affecting non-federal persons unless expressly authorized by a nondelegating statute.
The bill would add a new chapter to title 1 of the U.S. Code establishing a separation-of-powers framework, including a reporting requirement for the Comptroller General. Within six months after enactment, the Comptroller General would have to identify preexisting statutes that contain prohibited delegations. The bill further provides that noncompliant statutes, directives, rules, or regulations would have no force or effect, and it creates a private cause of action for aggrieved persons to seek declaratory and injunctive relief under federal law. The new chapter would apply prospectively to laws and regulations enacted or issued 90 days after enactment.
In practical terms, the bill would significantly affect administrative law and the modern regulatory state by limiting agency discretion and potentially invalidating large categories of federal regulations that rely on congressional delegation. It would also alter the legal landscape for enforcement actions by federal agencies and could expose many existing and future rules to challenge. Because the bill is framed as a statutory nondelegation rule, it would affect Congress, the executive branch, federal agencies, regulated industries, and individuals subject to federal regulation.
The overall sentiment reflected in the bill text is strongly critical of administrative agencies and strongly supportive of restoring a strict separation of powers. The findings describe agency delegation as unconstitutional and liken the current system to a due process problem, indicating a clear ideological purpose rather than a bipartisan compromise measure. No committee debate or votes are provided, so there is no recorded legislative opposition or support in the available materials beyond the bill’s introduction and referral.
The main point of contention would likely be whether Congress can and should impose such a sweeping nondelegation rule by statute, and whether the bill’s broad definitions would destabilize existing federal law. Critics would likely argue that it would undermine the administrative state, create uncertainty for longstanding regulations, and invite extensive litigation. Supporters would likely view it as a necessary correction to restore constitutional accountability and limit unelected bureaucratic power.
The bill would amend title 1 of the U.S. Code by adding a new “Separation of Powers” chapter that prohibits legislative delegation and sets out enforcement mechanisms. It would also require a Comptroller General report identifying statutes with prohibited delegations and would create a private right of action to challenge noncompliant federal actions. If enacted, it could affect a wide range of federal statutes, agency regulations, executive directives, and enforcement actions, especially in areas where Congress has historically delegated rulemaking or adjudicatory authority to agencies.
The bill’s tone and findings are strongly anti-delegation and pro-separation-of-powers, reflecting a clear preference for limiting administrative agencies and restoring direct congressional lawmaking. No votes or committee transcript are available, so there is no recorded bipartisan negotiation or formal opposition in the provided materials. Based on the text alone, the bill appears to be a high-conviction reform proposal rather than a consensus measure.
The central controversy is the bill’s sweeping prohibition on delegating legislative power, which would likely be seen by opponents as incompatible with modern governance and by supporters as constitutionally required. Another likely point of contention is the bill’s broad definition of prohibited delegation, which could reach many criminal, civil, and regulatory provisions and create substantial uncertainty. The private cause of action and de novo review standard would also be contentious because they would encourage litigation and weaken deference to agency action.