HB 328, the REVOCAR Act of 2025, would prohibit U.S. persons and entities they own or control from investing in, trading with, or operating in Venezuela’s energy sector, including providing goods, services, or financing to Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), the Maduro regime, or any nondemocratic successor government. The bill is explicitly tied to Congress’s finding that Venezuela’s July 28, 2024 presidential election was won by opposition candidate Edmundo González and that the Maduro government has refused to recognize those results while repressing political opponents.
The prohibition would take effect upon enactment and would apply notwithstanding preexisting contracts, licenses, or permits. It also bars transactions designed to evade the restriction and directs the Treasury Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to issue regulations and use International Emergency Economic Powers Act authorities to enforce the measure. Violations would be subject to IEEPA penalties, and all federal agencies would be expected to support implementation. The sanctions would end when the President certifies that Maduro has recognized González’s victory and transferred power, or on December 31, 2027, whichever comes first.
The bill also creates a limited presidential waiver authority. The President could waive the sanctions for up to 90 days at a time, and renew them once, but only after determining and reporting to Congress that the waiver is vital to U.S. national security. Any waiver report must explain the transaction being allowed, identify involved foreign entities, describe efforts to restrict financial flows to Maduro, and assess the waiver’s effect on democratic transition, regime resources, and human rights repression.
The bill’s impact on state and federal law is primarily in the foreign policy and sanctions arena: it would add a new statutory restriction on U.S. investment and commerce involving Venezuela’s energy sector and would expand the legal basis for Treasury enforcement under IEEPA. It would directly affect U.S. investors, energy companies, financial institutions, and any person or entity operating in or transacting with Venezuelan oil and gas interests, especially PDVSA and regime-linked counterparties.
Because there are no recorded votes or committee transcripts, the available context shows no formal debate history yet. The bill’s text suggests a strongly punitive, pro-democracy posture toward the Maduro government, with bipartisan sponsorship from Representatives Wasserman Schultz and Salazar. The main likely point of contention is whether broad energy-sector sanctions will effectively pressure Maduro or instead worsen economic conditions and complicate U.S. energy and diplomatic interests; the waiver provisions appear designed to address those concerns by preserving some flexibility for national security needs.
The bill would create a new federal sanctions regime prohibiting U.S. persons and U.S.-controlled entities from investing in, trading with, or providing goods, services, or financing to Venezuela’s energy sector, including PDVSA and the Maduro government. It authorizes Treasury, in consultation with State, to implement the restrictions using IEEPA-based enforcement tools and penalties, and it would override prior contracts or licenses to the extent necessary. The measure would directly affect U.S. companies, investors, and financial intermediaries with exposure to Venezuelan oil and gas, while also setting a termination trigger tied to democratic transition or a sunset date in 2027.
The bill appears to be framed positively by its sponsors as a human-rights and democracy measure aimed at pressuring the Maduro regime after the 2024 election. The text reflects a strong consensus in favor of sanctions as a response to electoral repression, but there is no recorded committee debate or vote history in the provided materials. The inclusion of a waiver process suggests an effort to balance hardline sanctions with executive flexibility for national security needs.
The central policy dispute is likely whether cutting off U.S. investment in Venezuela’s energy sector will meaningfully advance democratic change or instead reduce leverage, harm economic conditions, and create collateral effects for U.S. businesses and energy markets. Another likely point of contention is the scope and rigidity of the prohibition, including its application to existing contracts and its reach to entities owned or controlled by U.S. persons. The waiver authority may also be debated, with some viewing it as necessary flexibility and others as too permissive or too restrictive depending on their stance on sanctions policy.