An Act to amend and reenact § 19.2-303.6 of the Code of Virginia, relating to deferred disposition in a criminal case; persons with autism, intellectual disabilities, or developmental disabilities; expungement.
HB247 amends Virginia’s deferred disposition statute for certain criminal cases involving defendants diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder, intellectual disability, or developmental disability. Under the bill, a court may defer further proceedings, place the defendant on probation, and later dismiss the case without entering a judgment of guilt if the defendant consents and the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the criminal conduct was caused by or had a direct and substantial relationship to the person’s disorder or disability. The bill excludes the most serious offenses, including capital murder, acts of violence, and crimes that already have their own deferred disposition procedures.
The bill also allows a defendant to request a hearing on deferred disposition before or after a plea, requires the court to consider the Commonwealth’s position and the victim’s views, and permits the court to enter a conviction if the defendant violates the conditions of probation. If the defendant completes the terms, the dismissed charge may be treated as dismissed for purposes of expungement under Virginia’s expungement statute. The measure further protects statements made during the deferred-disposition process by making them generally inadmissible in later criminal proceedings, with limited exceptions for perjury and impeachment.
HB247 narrows and clarifies § 19.2-303.6 of the Code of Virginia by expressly extending deferred disposition eligibility to defendants with autism spectrum disorder, intellectual disability, or developmental disability, and by linking eligibility to a finding that the disability substantially contributed to the offense. It affects criminal procedure, probation, dismissal, and expungement rules, and it gives courts additional discretion to resolve qualifying cases without a formal conviction while preserving judicial authority to impose sanctions if conditions are violated.
The available record shows no committee transcript, recorded votes, or opposition statements, so the bill’s sentiment cannot be measured from debate history. Based on the enacted text, the measure appears to reflect a generally supportive, accommodation-oriented approach toward defendants with developmental disabilities, emphasizing treatment-aware discretion, individualized judicial review, and a path to dismissal and expungement for successful completion.
The main potential points of contention are the scope of eligibility and the required causal connection between the disability and the criminal conduct. Questions may arise over how courts determine whether the disorder or disability directly and substantially contributed to the offense, what evidence is sufficient, and how much weight should be given to the Commonwealth’s attorney and the victim. Another possible issue is whether expanding deferred disposition and later expungement appropriately balances rehabilitation and public safety, especially for defendants with prior convictions or prior deferred cases, though the statute preserves judicial discretion to deny relief when inconsistent with the interests of justice.