A joint resolution proposing a balanced budget amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
Summary
SJR97 is a joint resolution proposing a constitutional balanced budget amendment. It would require that federal expenditures and receipts be balanced, though the balance could be achieved over more than one year. The proposal excludes debt payments from expenditures and borrowing from receipts, and it directs Congress to reach balance within 10 years after ratification.
The resolution also creates an emergency exception. In limited emergency situations, Congress could authorize spending above the balanced-budget limit if two-thirds of both the House and Senate approve the measure. Any debt incurred under that exception would have to be repaid as soon as practicable. If ratified by three-fourths of the states within seven years, the amendment would become part of the Constitution.
Impact
If adopted, the resolution would amend the U.S. Constitution and significantly constrain federal fiscal policy by imposing a balanced-budget requirement on Congress. It would affect future appropriations, revenue policy, deficit spending, and emergency spending authority, while leaving debt-service payments outside the balance calculation. Because it is a constitutional amendment, it would not directly change existing state statutes, but it would alter the federal budget framework that governs federal spending and borrowing.
Sentiment
The available record shows no committee transcript or vote history, so there is no documented debate or recorded sentiment in the provided materials. Based on the text alone, the measure reflects a fiscally conservative approach favoring budget discipline and limits on deficit spending. The inclusion of an emergency exception suggests an effort to balance fiscal restraint with flexibility for extraordinary circumstances.
Contention
The main points of contention likely center on whether a balanced budget requirement would unduly restrict Congress during recessions, wars, or other crises, and whether the 10-year phase-in is workable. Supporters would likely emphasize fiscal discipline, reduced deficits, and constitutional enforcement of budget balance, while critics may argue that such an amendment could force spending cuts or tax increases at inopportune times and reduce federal responsiveness. The emergency-spending exception and the two-thirds approval threshold are likely to be debated as either necessary safeguards or too rigid a constraint.