Dangerous Viral Gain of Function Research Moratorium Act
SB 738, the Dangerous Viral Gain of Function Research Moratorium Act, would impose a moratorium on federal research grants to any institution of higher education or other research institute that is conducting “dangerous gain-of-function research.” The bill defines gain-of-function research broadly to include genetic alteration of an organism to increase infectivity, transmissibility, pathogenicity, or host range, or research that could reasonably be expected to create an organism with enhanced ability to spread or cause harm.
The bill specifically targets research involving influenza viruses, coronaviruses, including MERS, SARS-CoV-1, SARS-CoV-2, and SARS-like viruses, as well as certain agents or toxins on federal select-agent lists and synthetic constructs of those organisms. If an institution is found to be conducting such research, it would become ineligible for federal research grant support under the bill’s prohibition.
SB 738 would affect federal research funding by conditioning eligibility for grants on whether an institution is engaged in covered gain-of-function research. It would not directly amend state law, but it would significantly alter the federal funding landscape for universities, medical schools, and research institutes working on virology, biosafety, biodefense, and related life-science research. The bill could also influence institutional research policies, compliance programs, and decisions about whether to pursue or continue certain pathogen-related studies.
Based on the bill text and the absence of recorded committee debate or votes, the available record shows a clear precautionary and restrictive posture toward high-risk pathogen research. The sponsors’ framing suggests concern about biosafety, public safety, and national security risks associated with gain-of-function work. No contrary sentiment is documented in the provided materials, but the proposal itself indicates a strong preference for limiting federal support to institutions engaged in this type of research.
The main point of contention is likely the breadth of the definition of “gain-of-function research,” which covers not only deliberate enhancement of pathogens but also research that may be reasonably anticipated to increase infectivity, pathogenicity, transmissibility, or host range. Critics could argue that this language is overinclusive, may capture legitimate basic or defensive research, and could chill scientific inquiry. Supporters are likely to emphasize the potential risks to human health, livestock, poultry, aquaculture, and national security, and to argue that federal funding should not support institutions conducting such work.