The SAFE Act of 2026 would substantially amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), with a particular focus on Section 702 surveillance, FBI querying practices, court oversight, and transparency. The bill tightens rules for querying information collected under Section 702, including mandatory training, written justifications, recordkeeping, periodic DOJ audits, and additional approval requirements for sensitive queries involving elected officials, political organizations, media organizations, religious organizations, and Members of Congress. It also limits warrantless access to certain U.S.-person information returned from queries, adds exceptions for emergencies, consent, and certain cybersecurity uses, and requires more detailed reporting to Congress and the public.
Beyond Section 702, the bill adds new disclosure and accuracy requirements for FISA applications, including a duty to provide the court all material information, including exculpatory information, and new certification requirements that applications reflect all information that could call into question the government’s assertions. It also restricts the use of information from media sources or political campaigns unless disclosed and corroborated, and limits reliance on such information in applications. The bill creates new criminal penalties for certain FISA-related false statements and unauthorized disclosures, requires agency compliance procedures and Inspector General audits, and expands the role of amicus curiae in the FISA Court and FISA Court of Review.
The bill also addresses intelligence and law-enforcement access to commercially available or brokered data. It would generally bar intelligence agencies from acquiring covered U.S.-person data from data brokers except under specified exceptions, and would prohibit law enforcement from purchasing personal data from data brokers in exchange for value, subject to exceptions for court orders, whistleblower programs, employment-related use, public data, emergencies, compliance purposes, and consent. Related provisions extend similar privacy protections to online service providers and intermediary or ancillary service providers, and require stronger limits on disclosure and use of such data.
In addition, the bill extends the current FISA Section 702 authority through April 20, 2028, while also imposing a temporary sunset on certain expanded definitions and directives related to electronic communication service providers at the end of 2026. It requires enhanced public and congressional reporting by the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General, including statistics on targets, selectors, directives, U.S.-person identities in intelligence reports, and certain queries and criminal uses of intelligence-derived information. It also allows limited delays in implementation of up to 180 days for technical or staffing reasons.
Because there are no committee transcripts or recorded votes provided, the available context shows no documented floor or committee sentiment. Based on the bill’s structure and sponsors, it appears to be a reform-oriented surveillance and privacy measure intended to preserve intelligence authorities while increasing civil-liberties protections, oversight, and transparency. The main likely points of contention are the tighter limits on FBI and intelligence-community querying, the restrictions on purchasing data from brokers, the expanded disclosure obligations to courts and Congress, and the stronger role for FISA Court amici and judicial review, all of which would be viewed by supporters as accountability measures and by critics as potentially burdensome to national-security and law-enforcement operations.
The bill would amend multiple provisions of FISA, title 18 of the U.S. Code, and related intelligence statutes to impose new substantive limits, procedures, reporting duties, and oversight mechanisms. It would change how Section 702 acquisitions are targeted and queried, add new requirements for FISA applications and court review, create new compliance and disciplinary frameworks inside federal agencies, and narrow the circumstances under which intelligence and law-enforcement agencies may obtain or use data from brokers, online services, and intermediary providers. It also extends Section 702’s authorization period to April 20, 2028, while setting certain temporary sunsets and implementation delays, thereby altering both the scope and administration of federal surveillance and data-acquisition authorities.
No votes or committee transcript excerpts are provided, so there is no recorded legislative debate to measure directly. The bill’s text and title indicate a generally reform-minded, pro-privacy posture that seeks to preserve foreign-intelligence authorities while adding safeguards, transparency, and accountability. Its sponsors from both parties suggest some bipartisan interest in reform, but the breadth of the restrictions implies that the measure would likely draw mixed reactions from national-security advocates, privacy advocates, and law-enforcement stakeholders.
The most likely areas of contention are the bill’s tighter controls on Section 702 querying, especially the restrictions on accessing U.S.-person information without a warrant or qualifying exception, and the special approval and notification rules for queries involving Members of Congress, political figures, media, and religious organizations. Another major point of dispute is the proposed ban on intelligence and law-enforcement purchases of personal data from brokers, which could be seen as limiting investigative tools. The expanded disclosure obligations, mandatory audits, stronger FISA Court amicus participation, and new criminal penalties for FISA violations may also be controversial because they increase oversight and potential liability for agencies and personnel.