Special Operator Protection Act of 2026
SB3651, titled the Special Operator Protection Act of 2026, would create a new federal criminal offense in title 18 for doxing certain protected national security personnel. The bill defines a “covered person” to include members of the special operations forces, certain Department of Defense personnel designated by the Secretary of Defense who participate in sensitive activities, and federal law enforcement officers assigned to or working with special operations forces.
The bill makes it unlawful to knowingly make “restricted personal information” about a covered person, or that person’s immediate family member, publicly available when done with the intent to threaten, intimidate, or incite violence, or with knowledge that the information will be used to threaten, intimidate, or facilitate a violent crime. Restricted personal information includes identifying details such as name tied to employment, images of the person or home tied to employment, home contact information, date of birth, Social Security number, and biometric data. Violations would be punishable by up to 5 years in prison, or more severe penalties if death or serious bodily injury results.
If enacted, the bill would add a new section 120 to chapter 7 of title 18, United States Code, and update the chapter’s table of sections accordingly. It would expand federal criminal law by specifically targeting the public disclosure of sensitive personal information about special operations personnel and certain associated federal law enforcement officers, as well as their immediate family members, when tied to threats or violence. The measure would create new exposure for individuals who publish or disseminate such information with the prohibited intent or knowledge, while leaving ordinary publication of information outside the statute’s scope unless the required intent or knowledge is present.
The available record suggests generally supportive and protective intent behind the bill, reflected in its bipartisan introduction by Senator Budd and Senator Shaheen. The bill’s framing around safeguarding special operations personnel and their families indicates a security-focused consensus, and there is no recorded committee debate or vote history in the provided materials showing opposition or amendment activity. Because the bill was only read twice and referred to the Judiciary Committee, the public legislative record here is limited.
The main potential points of contention are likely to involve the balance between protecting service members and preserving free speech, press freedom, and lawful public-interest reporting. The bill’s use of terms like “publicly available,” “intent to threaten, intimidate, or incite,” and “knowledge that the information will be used” may raise questions about evidentiary standards and how broadly the offense could be applied. Another possible issue is the breadth of the definition of “restricted personal information,” especially the inclusion of biometric data and family members’ information, which could prompt concerns about overbreadth or chilling effects even though the bill is narrowly tied to violent intent.