SB 2259, the “Protecting Military Bases from Connected Vehicles of Concern Act of 2025,” would prohibit certain connected vehicles from being operated on Department of Defense property beginning January 1, 2028. The bill targets vehicles that are designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction of a foreign entity of concern, if those vehicles are determined to pose risks related to sabotage, subversion, critical infrastructure, the digital economy, national security, or the safety of U.S. persons.
The bill directs the Secretary of Defense to publish, by January 1, 2027, a public list of prohibited connected vehicles and to update that list at least annually. In creating the list, the Secretary must incorporate existing federal rules, consult with other relevant federal agencies, and explain any removals from the list. The bill also requires a briefing to the congressional defense committees by June 1, 2027, outlining an implementation plan, including the lead DOD office, identification and assessment procedures, interagency coordination, compliance measures at installations, threat-assessment metrics, and resource needs.
If enacted, the bill would add a new federal restriction on vehicle access to military installations and other Department of Defense property, effectively barring specified connected vehicles from being operated on those sites after the effective date. It would also require the Department of Defense to create and maintain a public prohibited-vehicle list, coordinate with other agencies, and develop an implementation framework, thereby affecting DOD security policy, procurement/operations planning, and installation compliance procedures rather than creating a general civilian driving ban.
The available record shows the bill was introduced and referred to the Senate Armed Services Committee, with no recorded votes or committee transcript excerpts provided. Based on the text, the bill appears to reflect a security-focused, precautionary approach to emerging vehicle technology and foreign supply-chain risk, suggesting likely support from national security advocates. No direct evidence of opposition is included in the provided materials.
The main policy issue is whether connected vehicles tied to foreign entities of concern pose sufficient national security risk to justify a categorical prohibition on DOD property. Potential points of contention include how broadly the Secretary of Defense may define and update the prohibited list, whether existing federal rules are adequate for identifying covered vehicles, and the operational burden on military installations and the Department of Defense in enforcing the ban. Another likely concern is the impact on vendors, vehicle owners, and technology suppliers whose products may be swept into the restriction through evolving security determinations.