HB 9123, titled the “Espionage Prevention Act,” would create a new National Security Act restriction on intelligence community funding to institutions of higher education that maintain relationships with certain China-linked entities. The bill defines covered entities broadly to include Confucius Institutes, the Thousand Talents Program, certain Chinese universities of concern, and entities on the 1260H list. A university with a contract, agreement, or gift relationship with a covered entity would become ineligible for intelligence community funds unless it ends that relationship.
The bill also gives the Director of National Intelligence authority to issue one-year waivers, renewable annually, if the institution has robust safeguards and the relationship is determined to be in the national security interest or not to pose a direct or indirect national security risk. The DNI would be required to provide outreach and technical assistance to help institutions comply, and to report to congressional intelligence committees on implementation and on institutions that receive intelligence community funds while maintaining such relationships.
The bill would amend the National Security Act of 1947 by adding a new section 121A and conforming the Act’s table of contents. In practical terms, it would condition access to intelligence community funding for colleges and universities on severing ties with specified Chinese government-, military-, and party-linked entities, while creating a waiver process and reporting obligations for the DNI. It would affect institutions of higher education, the intelligence community, and the congressional intelligence committees, and could require universities to review foreign partnerships, donations, and contracts involving China-related entities.
Based on the bill text and available context, the measure appears to be framed as a national security and counter-espionage proposal, with no recorded committee debate or votes in the provided materials. The overall tone of the legislation is strongly protective and skeptical of certain China-linked academic relationships, emphasizing risks to sensitive research, data, and election security. Because there is no transcript or vote history, there is no documented opposition or support in the record provided beyond the bill’s introduction and referral.
The main points of contention likely center on how broadly the bill defines covered entities and what counts as a disqualifying relationship. Universities could be affected by existing or indirect ties to Confucius Institutes, Chinese universities, or other listed entities, and critics might argue the bill could chill academic collaboration, research partnerships, and foreign donations. Supporters would likely focus on protecting sensitive research and preventing foreign influence, especially where military-civil fusion, defense links, Uyghur abuses, or election interference are alleged. The waiver authority is another likely flashpoint, since it gives the DNI significant discretion to decide when a relationship is sufficiently safeguarded or in the national interest.