HB2513, the CFPB–IG Reform Act of 2025, would create a separate Inspector General position for the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection and require that the position be filled through presidential appointment with Senate confirmation. The bill amends multiple provisions of federal law to remove the CFPB from the current arrangement under which the Inspector General for the Federal Reserve System also serves the Bureau, and instead establishes the CFPB Inspector General as an independent office within the Bureau’s structure.
The bill also adds oversight and administrative requirements for the new office. It directs the CFPB Inspector General to appear at semiannual hearings before specified congressional committees, requires the Bureau to dedicate 2 percent of transferred funds each fiscal year to the Inspector General’s office, and makes the CFPB a member of the Council of Inspectors General on Financial Oversight. It further sets a 60-day deadline for the President to appoint an Inspector General after enactment and provides transition language so that, once the new CFPB Inspector General is confirmed, the current combined Inspector General would become the Inspector General for the Federal Reserve Board.
In practical terms, the bill would change federal oversight law by separating CFPB audit and investigative functions from the Federal Reserve’s Inspector General office and by placing the CFPB Inspector General into the Senate-confirmed category of presidential appointees. It would also amend the Dodd-Frank Act and Title 5 of the U.S. Code to reflect the new office, its reporting obligations, and its funding stream.
Because there were no recorded committee transcripts or votes provided, the available context shows no formal debate history or roll-call sentiment. Based on the bill’s sponsorship and structure, the measure appears to be framed as an oversight and accountability reform, with supporters likely emphasizing independence and stronger supervision of the CFPB. No specific opposition arguments are documented in the supplied materials, but the main policy tension is likely whether the CFPB should have its own Senate-confirmed Inspector General and dedicated funding, versus retaining the existing shared oversight arrangement with the Federal Reserve.
Impact
The bill would amend chapter 4 of title 5 and sections of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act to establish a distinct Inspector General for the CFPB, require Senate confirmation, and set out reporting, funding, and transition rules. It would alter the oversight structure for the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, create a dedicated 2 percent funding allocation for the Inspector General’s office, and add the CFPB to the Council of Inspectors General on Financial Oversight.
Sentiment
No committee discussion or votes were provided, so there is no recorded legislative sentiment in the supplied materials. The bill’s text suggests a reform-oriented, pro-oversight rationale, with likely support from sponsors seeking greater independence and accountability for the CFPB Inspector General function. No formal opposition is documented in the available record.
Contention
The central point of contention is the governance of CFPB oversight: whether the Bureau should have its own Senate-confirmed Inspector General and dedicated funding, or continue under the current arrangement in which the Federal Reserve System’s Inspector General also covers the CFPB. Supporters are likely to argue that a separate IG would improve independence and transparency, while critics may view the change as duplicative, costly, or an unnecessary restructuring of existing oversight authority. No specific named opponents or committee objections are included in the provided materials.