Proposing a constitutional amendment establishing the Texas Redistricting Commission to redistrict the Texas Legislature and Texas congressional districts and revising procedures for redistricting.
HJR 135 proposes a constitutional amendment to create the Texas Redistricting Commission, a new seven-member body that would take over the task of drawing state legislative and U.S. congressional districts in Texas. The commission would be selected through a process involving senior legislative leaders from both parties, an additional bipartisan-selected member, and two retired federal judges appointed by that member. The measure also sets eligibility restrictions, training requirements, public-hearing and public-comment procedures, and deadlines for adopting and revising redistricting plans.
The resolution would shift redistricting authority away from the Legislature and, beginning in 2031, abolish the existing Legislative Redistricting Board and repeal the current constitutional provision governing legislative redistricting. It also amends the judicial redistricting process so that, if the Judicial Districts Board fails to act, the new commission would step in to reapportion judicial districts. The bill establishes substantive redistricting criteria, including compliance with federal law and the Voting Rights Act, protection against racial and language-minority vote dilution, contiguity, respect for communities of interest, minimizing splits of counties and other political subdivisions, and population-equality standards.
The overall sentiment reflected in the bill text is reform-oriented and aimed at making redistricting more independent, transparent, and procedurally constrained. Because there are no committee transcripts or recorded votes in the provided materials, there is no documented floor or committee debate to indicate broader support or opposition. The structure of the proposal suggests an effort to reduce partisan influence and increase public confidence in the map-drawing process.
The main points of contention likely center on the transfer of redistricting power from elected lawmakers to an appointed commission, the appointment structure itself, and the limits placed on political involvement and communications. Supporters would likely emphasize independence, anti-gerrymandering protections, and minority voting-rights safeguards, while critics may question whether the commission is truly insulated from politics, whether the selection process is sufficiently democratic, and whether the proposed standards could constrain legislative flexibility. The inclusion of political performance indexes and references to districts that lean toward each party may also draw scrutiny from those concerned about how neutrality would be measured and enforced.
If adopted, the amendment would substantially revise the Texas Constitution by creating a new redistricting regime for state legislative and congressional maps, replacing the Legislature’s current role with an independent commission and eventually eliminating the Legislative Redistricting Board. It would also alter judicial redistricting procedures by making the new commission a fallback body if the Judicial Districts Board fails to complete reapportionment. The proposal would require implementing legislation, state funding, and administrative support, and it would affect lawmakers, congressional districts, judicial districts, county and municipal boundaries, minority voters, and future redistricting litigation and compliance standards.
Based on the bill’s language, the measure is framed positively as a structural reform intended to improve fairness, transparency, and independence in redistricting. The absence of committee testimony and recorded votes means there is no direct evidence in the provided record of partisan alignment or organized opposition. Still, the proposal’s emphasis on bipartisan appointments, retired judges, and public participation suggests it is designed to appeal to reform-minded stakeholders concerned about gerrymandering and public trust.
The likely controversy is over who should control redistricting and how insulated the process should be from elected officials. Opponents may object to removing map-drawing authority from the Legislature, while supporters may argue that legislative self-interest has distorted the process. Additional contention may arise over the commission’s appointment mechanics, the prohibition on contacts with legislators, the use of political performance indexes, and whether the criteria for communities of interest and partisan neutrality are sufficiently clear or enforceable. The bill also raises questions about implementation timing, the transition away from the current board, and the extent to which judicial district reapportionment should be tied to the new commission.