Relating to penalties for intimidation and harassment of election officials and election interference; creating criminal offenses.
HB 4274 would create a new chapter in the Election Code establishing criminal offenses aimed at protecting election officials from intimidation, harassment, interference, and doxxing-related conduct. The bill defines “election official” broadly to include not only election workers but also local canvassing authority members, county auditors, and city secretaries with election duties. It makes it a felony to engage in a course of conduct that threatens or harasses an election official or their family, or to use force, coercion, violence, restraint, damage, harm, or financial reprisal to influence an official’s performance of election duties.
The bill also criminalizes intentionally interfering with, hindering, or preventing an election official from carrying out election-related duties, physically obstructing access to polling places or other election sites, and knowingly disseminating personal information when doing so creates an imminent and serious threat to the official or family member’s safety. It adds a conspiracy offense for agreements to violate the chapter and sets most offenses as third-degree felonies, with repeat offenses elevated to second-degree felonies and conspiracy treated as a state jail felony. A separate misdemeanor penalty applies to certain unlawful dissemination of personal information.
HB 4274 would amend the Election Code by adding Chapter 280 and would also expand the Government Code’s public-information exception in Section 552.117 to protect the home address, phone number, emergency contact information, Social Security number, and family-member status of current election officials. In practical terms, the bill would create new criminal penalties and privacy protections for election administrators and related personnel, while giving law enforcement and prosecutors additional tools to address threats, obstruction, and targeted disclosure of personal information tied to election work. The bill would take effect September 1, 2024, if enacted.
The available context shows the bill was referred to the House Elections Committee and there are no recorded committee transcripts or votes in the provided materials. Based on the bill’s caption and structure, the measure appears to be framed as a protective response to threats against election workers and election administration, suggesting a generally supportive or security-focused intent. However, because no debate or vote history is included, the record provided does not show broader legislative sentiment beyond referral.
The main points of potential contention are the breadth of the new criminal offenses and the scope of the protected conduct. Critics could question whether terms such as harassment, interference, or physically obstructing access are defined broadly enough to avoid sweeping in protest activity, advocacy, or contentious but lawful interactions near election sites. Another possible issue is the personal-information provision, which could raise concerns about balancing election-worker safety against free speech and public-records access. Supporters would likely emphasize the need to deter intimidation, doxxing, and obstruction of election officials, while opponents may focus on overcriminalization or ambiguity in enforcement.