Relating to election integrity and security, including by preventing fraud in the conduct of elections in this state; authorizing a penalty, increasing a penalty.
HB 1013 is a sweeping election-administration bill that would substantially rewrite the Texas Election Code in the name of election integrity, transparency, and fraud prevention. It shortens and restructures in-person voting into a 9-day period, repeals provisions governing early voting by personal appearance, and imposes new requirements for precinct size, polling-place location, ballot design, ballot numbering, chain-of-custody procedures, and physical poll lists. The bill also requires more extensive security measures for ballots and election materials, including locked storage, numbered seals, and reporting obligations when a security breach is suspected.
The bill would replace machine-based or centralized counting practices with mandatory hand counting at the precinct level, supported by continuous video recording, public posting of recordings, bipartisan counting teams, and a 30-day public review period before certification. It also creates new procedures for correcting counting errors, including lawsuits by voters, fee recovery for successful challengers, and potential recall and suspension of canvassing-authority members who fail to correct errors. The bill further restricts wireless devices and recording equipment near voting stations, limits polling-place locations, and requires Texas-based ballot printers with documented chain-of-custody controls.
HB 1013 would significantly alter state election law by repealing or narrowing multiple existing Election Code provisions, especially those related to early voting, polling-place administration, electronic poll lists, and certain absentee/mail-ballot procedures. It would impose new criminal penalties and increase existing ones for conduct such as obstructing election-supply distribution, unauthorized handling of ballot boxes, unlawful alteration of election procedures, and certain polling-place violations. Counties, election administrators, presiding judges, printers, canvassing authorities, and voters would all be directly affected by the bill’s new operational, security, and enforcement requirements.
The available context shows the bill was referred to the House Elections Committee and has no recorded votes or committee testimony in the provided materials, so there is no documented floor or committee sentiment to measure from the record here. Based on the bill’s framing and structure, it appears to be strongly motivated by concerns about election security and fraud prevention, with an emphasis on transparency, chain of custody, and public verification. The overall tone of the bill is assertive and enforcement-oriented rather than compromise-oriented.
The most likely points of contention are the bill’s elimination of early voting by personal appearance, its replacement of existing counting methods with mandatory hand counts, and its extensive new surveillance and public-recording requirements. Election officials and county administrators would likely object to the operational burden, cost, and feasibility of precinct-level hand counting, continuous video posting, and expanded reporting and litigation exposure. Voting-rights advocates and election administrators may also object to the increased criminal penalties, restrictions on polling-place locations and devices, and the bill’s potential to make voting less accessible while concentrating on fraud-prevention measures.