AN ACT to amend Tennessee Code Annotated, Title 39, relative to harassment.
HB0370 amends Tennessee’s harassment statute in Title 39 by expanding the definition of “communicate” for purposes of the offense. The bill specifies that communication includes contact made in person, in writing, by telephone, and through a broad range of electronic and digital methods, including text messages, email, instant messages, social media posts, websites, images, video, sound recordings, voice recordings, and other electronic transmissions. In practical terms, the measure clarifies that harassment can occur through modern online and electronic channels as well as traditional forms of contact.
The act takes effect July 1, 2025, and updates the statutory language used to define conduct covered by Tennessee’s harassment law. By broadening and modernizing the communication definition, it may affect how law enforcement, prosecutors, courts, and defendants evaluate harassment allegations involving digital communications and social media activity. The bill does not create a new offense, but it strengthens the existing framework by making clear that electronic and online messaging fall within the statute’s reach.
The bill amends Tennessee Code Annotated, Section 39-17-308(e)(2), which defines “communicate” in the harassment statute. The change expands the list of covered communication methods to expressly include social networks, social media, websites, and a wide range of digital media, thereby updating state law to reflect contemporary communication practices. This could broaden the evidentiary basis for harassment cases involving online conduct and clarify enforcement against electronic stalking or harassment behavior.
The bill appears to have been broadly supported and moved through the legislative process with strong committee approval. Recorded votes were overwhelmingly favorable, including several unanimous recommendations and only one dissenting vote in the House Judiciary Committee. The lack of recorded opposition in most stages suggests general agreement that the statute needed modernization to address electronic and social media communications.
The main point of contention, to the extent one existed, likely centered on the breadth of the expanded definition of “communicate” and how it might apply to online speech, messaging, or social media activity. While the bill was largely noncontroversial in committee, a single no vote in the House Judiciary Committee indicates at least some concern about the scope of the amendment, potentially related to free-speech implications, overbreadth, or enforcement in digital contexts. No detailed transcript debate is available, so the specific objections are not documented in the provided materials.