A BILL TO AMEND THE SOUTH CAROLINA CODE OF LAWS BY ADDING SECTION 7-13-1630 SO AS TO PROHIBIT STATE AGENCIES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FROM PURCHASING, LEASING, LICENSING, OR OTHERWISE ACQUIRING ELECTION SYSTEMS OR ELECTION-RELATED EQUIPMENT OR SERVICES FROM COMPANIES OWNED OR CONTROLLED BY A FOREIGN ADVERSARY.
H5545 would add a new section to the South Carolina Code restricting state agencies, counties, municipalities, and other political subdivisions from buying, leasing, licensing, or otherwise acquiring election systems, election-related equipment, or election-related services from companies owned or controlled by a “foreign adversary.” The bill defines covered election technology broadly to include voting machines, ballot marking devices, tabulation equipment, electronic poll books, voter registration systems, election management software, and systems used to transmit, store, audit, or report election data.
The bill also requires vendors to certify under penalty of perjury that they are not owned, controlled by, or subject to the direction of a foreign adversary. If a vendor falsely certifies, the contract may be voided, the vendor may face a civil penalty of up to $10,000 per violation, existing contracts may be terminated, and the vendor may be barred from state or local contracting for up to five years. The Attorney General or State Election Commission could seek injunctions or other relief in circuit court, and the Election Commission would be authorized to adopt implementing regulations.
The bill would create a new procurement restriction in election administration law and add enforcement mechanisms for violations. It would affect state and local purchasing practices for election technology and services, potentially requiring agencies and election officials to review vendor ownership and control structures before entering contracts. Existing contracts could continue only until they expire or July 1, 2029, whichever comes first, unless the State Election Commission grants a temporary waiver.
The measure would also expand the State Election Commission’s regulatory role and give the Attorney General and the Commission authority to enforce the restriction in court. Because the bill is expressly limited by federal law and treaty obligations, it is designed to operate only where consistent with federal requirements.
Based on the bill text and the absence of recorded committee debate or votes in the provided materials, the overall sentiment appears to be precautionary and security-focused. The legislation frames the issue as protecting election integrity and reducing foreign influence in election infrastructure, suggesting support from lawmakers concerned about cybersecurity and supply-chain risk. No contrary views are documented in the provided record.
The main point of contention is likely the breadth of the foreign-adversary restriction and how it would be applied in practice. Potential concerns include whether the definition of covered equipment and services is too expansive, whether vendors can reliably certify ownership and control, and whether the rule could disrupt existing election contracts or limit the pool of qualified suppliers. Another likely issue is the waiver process, since it gives the State Election Commission discretion to allow temporary continued use when no reasonable alternative exists and when security risks are not material.