A BILL TO AMEND THE SOUTH CAROLINA CODE OF LAWS BY ADDING SECTION 23-1-235 SO AS TO DEFINE CERTAIN TERMS, TO PROVIDE ONLY CERTAIN ENTITIES MAY USE AN AUTOMATIC LICENSE PLATE READER SYSTEM, TO PROVIDE THE LOCATIONS WHERE THE SYSTEM MAY BE INSTALLED, TO PROVIDE HOW INFORMATION OBTAINED THROUGH THE SYSTEM MAY BE USED, AND TO PROVIDE A PENALTY FOR VIOLATIONS OF THIS PROVISION.
H3155 creates a new section of South Carolina law governing the use of automatic license plate reader (ALPR) systems. It defines key terms such as “automatic license plate reader system,” “captured plate data,” “alert,” “governmental entity,” and “secured area,” and then generally makes it unlawful for individuals, businesses, associations, and government entities to use ALPR systems unless the use falls within specific exceptions. The bill allows use by state, county, and municipal law enforcement agencies for comparisons against specified government and law-enforcement databases, by parking enforcement entities, for access control in secured areas, and by the Department of Public Safety and Department of Transportation for commercial vehicle compliance and movement at weigh station facilities.
The bill also imposes operational limits on how ALPR data may be handled. It requires that data collected under the section not be used or shared for any other purpose, not be retained for more than 90 days, and be destroyed when an investigation ends if no charges are filed or after the related criminal matter concludes. Governmental users must update captured plate data every 24 hours if updates are available, and they may not sell, trade, or exchange the data, except that law enforcement may share evidence of an offense with other law enforcement agencies. Violations are made a misdemeanor punishable by up to one year in prison, and the act takes effect upon gubernatorial approval.
If enacted, H3155 would add a new statutory framework in Title 23 regulating who may operate ALPR systems in South Carolina and under what conditions. It would restrict use by private parties and most government actors, while preserving limited law-enforcement, parking, secured-area, and commercial-vehicle enforcement uses. The bill would also create new data-retention, sharing, and destruction requirements for captured plate data and establish criminal penalties for violations, thereby affecting law enforcement agencies, transportation agencies, parking operators, and any entity using license plate reader technology.
Based on the bill text and available context, the measure appears to reflect a cautious or restrictive approach to ALPR technology, emphasizing privacy, data control, and limited authorized use. There is no recorded committee debate or vote history in the provided materials, so no direct support or opposition can be measured from transcripts or roll calls. The structure of the bill suggests an intent to permit targeted public-safety and operational uses while limiting broader deployment and secondary use of the data.
The likely points of contention are the breadth of the prohibition on ALPR use, the narrowness of the exceptions, and the strict limits on data retention and sharing. Supporters of broader ALPR deployment may object to the ban on use by private entities and the restrictions on governmental use, arguing that the technology is useful for crime prevention, investigations, and traffic or access management. Opponents of expansive use may support the bill’s privacy protections, especially the 90-day retention cap, destruction requirements, and limits on selling or exchanging data. The most sensitive issue is probably the balance between law-enforcement access to plate data and concerns about surveillance and misuse.