TO APPROVE AND PUBLISH AND SUBMIT TO THE ELECTORS A PROPOSITION OF, AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE -- REFERENDUM ON LINE, ITEM VETO
Summary
S2317 is a joint resolution proposing a constitutional amendment to give the governor of Rhode Island a line-item veto over budget bills and other bills that appropriate money. Under the proposal, the governor could approve an appropriations bill in full, reduce specific dollar amounts while approving the rest, or disapprove individual items or parts of items, subject to the same veto-override rules that apply to other legislation. The resolution also specifies that the governor could not use the line-item veto to create new words or new sentences by striking letters or combining sentence fragments.
The resolution would replace Article IX, Section 14 of the state constitution and submit the amendment to voters at the next statewide general election. If approved, the Secretary of State would be required to publish the proposal and include it in election notices, and the amendment would be decided by the electorate rather than taking effect directly through the General Assembly.
Its main legal impact would be to change the balance of budgetary power between the executive and legislative branches by expanding the governor’s ability to selectively veto appropriations. This would affect state budget bills, appropriations measures, and any legislation containing funding items or conditions tied to appropriated money, while leaving the existing veto-override framework in place for legislative reconsideration.
The bill text itself is procedural and does not show committee debate or recorded votes, so there is no direct evidence of support or opposition in the provided materials. However, the proposal’s structure suggests it is intended to appeal to those who favor stronger executive control over spending and more targeted budget veto authority, while likely drawing concern from those who prefer to preserve full legislative control over appropriations and resist expanding gubernatorial power.
Notable points of contention would likely center on whether a line-item veto improves fiscal discipline or instead weakens the General Assembly’s role in budgeting. Another likely issue is the scope of the veto power over conditions attached to appropriations, since the amendment expressly addresses reductions, disapprovals, and restrictions on appropriated funds.
Impact
If adopted, the amendment would revise the Rhode Island Constitution to authorize a gubernatorial line-item veto for appropriations legislation, including the power to reduce specific sums or strike individual items or parts of items in budget-related bills. It would alter the constitutional veto process for spending measures while preserving the legislature’s ability to override vetoes by the required supermajority. The proposal would affect the governor, the General Assembly, and the handling of state budget and appropriations statutes, but only after voter approval at a statewide general election.
Sentiment
No committee transcript or vote data were provided, so the record does not show measured legislative sentiment. Based on the text, the proposal appears to be framed as a government-structure reform rather than a partisan policy bill, and its likely reception would split along institutional lines: supporters of executive budget restraint and opponents of expanded gubernatorial authority. The absence of recorded debate or votes means sentiment cannot be determined from the supplied materials beyond that general inference.
Contention
The central point of contention is the expansion of the governor’s power over appropriations, especially whether selective veto authority would improve fiscal management or undermine the legislature’s power of the purse. Another likely dispute is the amendment’s treatment of conditions attached to appropriated funds, because it explicitly preserves certain sums when related conditions are disapproved. Supporters would likely emphasize flexibility and accountability in budgeting, while critics would likely argue that the change concentrates too much power in the executive branch and could be used to reshape enacted spending priorities.