Requires search warrant for electronic information, prohibits stingray cell-site simulators.
H5360 creates a new chapter in Rhode Island criminal procedure called the Electronic Information and Data Privacy Act. The bill generally requires law enforcement to obtain a search warrant based on probable cause before accessing electronic information or data, including the location information, stored data, or transmitted data of an electronic device, and certain information held by remote computing service providers. It also establishes rules for how law enforcement may use, copy, disclose, and destroy nonresponsive electronic data collected during a warrant execution, and it requires notice to the owner of the device or data after the search, subject to delayed-notice procedures approved by a court.
The bill also tightens rules for obtaining subscriber records and other third-party electronic records from service providers, generally requiring a warrant except in specified circumstances such as consent, recognized warrant exceptions, public disclosure, emergency disclosures, or certain child-exploitation-related reports. In addition, it amends Rhode Island’s pen register and trap-and-trace statutes to expressly include “stingray” cell-site simulators, requiring a court order for their use in criminal investigations and setting procedures for applications, duration, secrecy, provider assistance, and immunity for good-faith compliance. The act would take effect upon passage.
If enacted, H5360 would add a new statutory privacy framework in Title 12 and materially expand warrant protections for digital data, location tracking, and subscriber information in criminal investigations. It would also amend existing pen register and trap-and-trace law to regulate cell-site simulators, making stingray use subject to judicial authorization and aligning provider-assistance and immunity provisions with the new order process. The bill would affect law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, electronic communication service providers, remote computing service providers, and individuals whose electronic data or account records are sought in investigations.
The available record shows no committee transcript, roll-call vote, or formal opposition/support statements, so there is no documented debate to measure. Based on the bill text and caption, the measure appears to be framed as a privacy-protection and civil-liberties bill, with a clear emphasis on limiting warrantless access to digital information and adding judicial oversight for stingray use. The absence of recorded votes or hearing discussion means the overall sentiment cannot be assessed from the provided materials beyond the bill’s protective intent.
The main likely points of contention are the balance between privacy and investigative flexibility, and the scope of exceptions to the warrant requirement. Law enforcement may view the warrant mandate, notice requirements, data-destruction rule, and restrictions on subscriber-record access as potentially burdensome in fast-moving investigations, while privacy advocates are likely to support those same provisions as necessary safeguards against broad digital surveillance. The stingray provisions may also be controversial because they regulate a surveillance tool often used covertly, requiring court approval and limiting disclosure, which could prompt debate over operational secrecy versus transparency and accountability.