In assault, further providing for the offense of terrorism.
Summary
HB1698 amends Pennsylvania’s terrorism statute in Title 18 by increasing the maximum prison sentence for a person convicted of terrorism when the underlying violent offense is a first-degree felony. Under current law, the court may impose a sentence of up to 40 years; the bill would replace that cap with a maximum term of life imprisonment. The bill also retains the existing fine authority of up to $100,000.
The measure is narrow in scope and does not redefine terrorism or change the elements of the offense. Instead, it changes only the grading and penalty provision for the most serious terrorism cases, making the sentencing range substantially harsher for convictions tied to first-degree felony violent offenses. The bill would take effect 60 days after enactment.
Impact
HB1698 would amend 18 Pa.C.S. § 2717, the terrorism penalty provision, by expanding the sentencing authority available to courts in cases involving a first-degree felony violent offense. The practical effect is to allow a life sentence where the current statute limits imprisonment to 40 years, increasing potential punishment for the most serious terrorism-related convictions. It would affect defendants charged under the terrorism statute, prosecutors seeking enhanced penalties, and sentencing courts applying the revised maximum term.
Sentiment
No committee transcript or recorded vote information is provided, so there is no direct evidence of support or opposition from legislative debate. Based on the text alone, the bill appears to reflect a punitive, public-safety-oriented approach to terrorism offenses, with an emphasis on increasing penalties for the most severe cases.
Contention
Because there are no transcripts or votes included, specific points of contention are not documented. The likely area of debate would be whether allowing life imprisonment for a terrorism conviction tied to a first-degree felony is proportionate and necessary, versus whether the existing 40-year maximum is sufficient. Any disagreement would likely center on sentencing severity, proportionality, and the scope of punishment for terrorism-related conduct.
In assault, further providing for the offenses of simple assault, of recklessly endangering another person, of terroristic threats, of harassment and of stalking; in kidnapping, further providing for the offenses of unlawful restraint, of false imprisonment and of criminal coercion; in sexual offenses, further providing for the offense of indecent assault; and, in riot, disorderly conduct and related offenses, further providing for the offense of disorderly conduct.
In criminal homicide, repealing provisions relating to the offense of drug delivery resulting in death; in assault, providing for the offense of drug delivery resulting in death or serious bodily injury; in arson, criminal mischief and other property destruction, further providing for additional fine for arson committed for profit; in wiretapping and electronic surveillance, further providing for definitions; in limitation of time, further providing for no limitation applicable and for other offenses; and, in sentencing, further providing for sentences for second and subsequent offenses.