Defines the terms "person", "human", and "human being" to mean a member of the species homo sapiens at any stage of biological development beginning at the moment of fertilization regardless of age, health, level of functioning, or condition of dependency; requires the right to life of all human beings.
A01893 is a proposed constitutional amendment that would define the words “person,” “human,” and “human being” in the New York Constitution to include a member of the species homo sapiens at any stage of biological development, beginning at fertilization. The measure states that this definition applies regardless of age, health, level of functioning, or dependency, and it declares that the inalienable right to life of every human being at any stage of development must be protected.
Because it is a concurrent resolution proposing a constitutional amendment, the bill does not itself change statutory law immediately. Instead, it would place the proposed definition into the state constitution if approved through the required legislative process and subsequent voter approval procedures. Its practical effect would be far-reaching, potentially influencing how New York law treats embryos and fetuses in areas such as abortion, reproductive rights, wrongful death, medical decision-making, and other laws that depend on the legal definition of “person.”
If adopted, the resolution would amend Article 1 of the New York Constitution by adding a new section defining legal personhood from fertilization onward. That would likely affect interpretation of existing statutes and constitutional rights across multiple areas of law, especially those involving reproductive health, fetal rights, and the scope of protections owed to unborn human beings. As a constitutional amendment proposal, it would not alter the state code directly unless and until it completed the amendment process and was ratified by voters.
The available record shows no committee transcript or vote history, so there is no documented floor or committee debate in the materials provided. Based on the text alone, the bill reflects a strongly pro-life policy position and is framed in absolute terms about personhood and the right to life. The absence of recorded votes or discussion prevents a more detailed assessment of legislative sentiment, but the proposal itself is clearly intended to advance fetal personhood protections.
The central point of contention is the bill’s definition of personhood at fertilization, which would likely conflict with existing reproductive rights frameworks and could have major implications for abortion access and related medical care. Supporters would be expected to view the measure as protecting unborn life and extending constitutional recognition to embryos and fetuses, while opponents would likely argue that it threatens established abortion rights, creates legal uncertainty, and could affect contraception, fertility treatment, and medical practice. No specific legislators or stakeholders are identified in the provided materials, but the issue is inherently divisive and likely to draw strong positions from pro-life and reproductive-rights advocates.