Establishes the "protect our privacy (POP) act" to impose limitations on the use of drones for law enforcement purposes; prohibits the use of drones by law enforcement at concerts, protests, demonstrations, or other actions protected by the first amendment.
A00972, titled the “protect our privacy (POP) act,” would sharply restrict the use of drones by law enforcement agencies in New York. As drafted, it broadly prohibits police and other law enforcement entities from using drones for law enforcement purposes and bars courts from issuing warrants authorizing such use. It also forbids law enforcement from contracting with private parties to obtain drone-derived information. The bill creates narrow exceptions for search and rescue operations and for assessing dangerous conditions after natural disasters.
The bill further limits drone use at concerts, protests, demonstrations, and other activities protected by the First Amendment and the New York Constitution, and it bans armed drones outright. It also imposes strict rules on data collected through permitted drone use, including limits on sharing personally identifying information, a private right of action for unlawful disclosure, and requirements to delete certain facial-recognition-related drone data retroactively. The measure would also require redaction of personal information before FOIL release, mandate destruction of older drone data not tied to active proceedings, and provide suppression of evidence and civil remedies for violations.
If enacted, the bill would amend the New York Civil Rights Law by adding a new section 52-e and would significantly constrain law enforcement surveillance and evidence-gathering practices involving drones. It would affect state and local police, other public safety agencies, courts issuing warrants, private vendors working with government agencies, and individuals whose data is captured by drones. The bill would also create new litigation exposure through a private right of action, mandatory attorneys’ fees, and suppression remedies, while imposing retention, deletion, and disclosure obligations on government-held drone data.
No committee transcript or vote record is available in the provided materials, so there is no direct evidence of support or opposition from formal debate or roll call. Based on the bill text, the measure appears strongly privacy-protective and civil-liberties oriented, with an emphasis on limiting surveillance and protecting protest activity and other constitutionally protected conduct. The overall framing suggests support from privacy and civil rights advocates, though the breadth of the restrictions indicates it could draw concern from law enforcement and public safety stakeholders.
The main points of contention are likely to be the bill’s near-total prohibition on law enforcement drone use, its ban on drone surveillance at protests and other First Amendment-protected events, and its retroactive deletion and suppression provisions for facial-recognition-related drone data. Law enforcement agencies may object that the bill is too restrictive for investigations, crowd management, and public safety operations, while supporters are likely to argue that the exceptions for search and rescue and disaster assessment are appropriately narrow and that stronger limits are needed to prevent surveillance abuse. The private right of action, mandatory data destruction, and FOIL disclosure rules may also be disputed because they create compliance burdens and potential liability.