Allows evidence of a defendant's prior crimes or acts to be admissible in a criminal case for certain purposes including as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, state of mind of the defendant, state of mind of the victim or other party, absence of mistake or accident, identity, modus operandi, or common scheme or plan; requires that the prosecution provide reasonable notice of the general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
A00053 would add a new section to New York’s Criminal Procedure Law governing when evidence of a defendant’s prior crimes, wrongs, or other acts may be used in a criminal trial. As a general rule, the bill preserves the existing prohibition on using prior bad acts to show a person’s criminal character or propensity, but it expressly allows such evidence for other purposes, including motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, state of mind, absence of mistake or accident, identity, modus operandi, and common scheme or plan. The bill also requires the prosecution to give reasonable advance notice of any such evidence it intends to introduce, unless the court excuses pretrial notice for good cause.
The bill creates a specific rule for sexual offense prosecutions. In those cases, evidence that the defendant committed another sexual offense would be admissible and could be considered for any relevant purpose, subject to the court’s discretion to exclude it if its probative value is outweighed by undue prejudice. The bill defines “sexual offense” broadly to include certain offenses under Article 130 of the Penal Law, as well as specified prostitution-related offenses and attempts or conspiracies to commit those acts. The measure would take effect immediately if enacted.
This bill would amend the Criminal Procedure Law by adding section 60.77, expanding and clarifying the circumstances under which prior bad acts evidence may be admitted in criminal cases. It would affect prosecutors, criminal defendants, trial courts, and evidentiary rulings by codifying a notice requirement and by creating a more permissive standard for prior sexual-offense evidence in sex-crime prosecutions. The bill would also give judges explicit discretion to exclude evidence when unfair prejudice outweighs its probative value.
Based on the bill text and available context, the measure appears to be framed as a prosecution tool and a victim-protection measure, with an emphasis on allowing juries to hear evidence relevant to intent, pattern, and credibility in certain cases. There is no recorded committee debate or vote history provided, so no formal legislative sentiment can be measured from the available materials. The overall tone of the proposal suggests support from sponsors for strengthening admissibility rules in sexual offense and other criminal cases.
The main point of contention is likely to be the balance between probative value and unfair prejudice. Supporters would view the bill as improving the truth-seeking function of trials, especially in sexual offense cases where patterns of conduct may be highly relevant. Opponents would likely argue that admitting prior crimes or acts risks propensity reasoning, undermines the presumption of innocence, and could unfairly sway juries against defendants. The bill attempts to address that concern by preserving judicial discretion to exclude evidence when prejudice outweighs relevance and by requiring notice to the defense.