A BILL for an Act to create and enact a new section to chapter 16.1-15 of the North Dakota Century Code, relating to the prohibition against using voting systems in certain elections; and to amend and reenact sections 16.1-06-12, 16.1-06-14, and 16.1-06-15 and subsection 1 of section 16.1-06-26 of the North Dakota Century Code, relating to election security and validation.
HB 1587 would substantially tighten North Dakota’s election security rules for voting systems and tabulation. The bill revises statutory definitions related to ballots, ballot-marking devices, and voting systems, and it adds new certification and security requirements for equipment used in elections. Among other changes, it would require voting systems to meet U.S. Election Assistance Commission guidelines version 2.0, immediately decertify systems certified only to version 1.0, and require the secretary of state to ensure systems are current on security patches and antivirus protection before use.
The bill also expands testing and audit requirements. It would require pre-election logic-and-accuracy testing, public notice and access to test results, sealing of programming after testing, and a post-election random test of voting system programming. If a system is not current or fails security/testing requirements, the bill directs election officials to hand count ballots instead of using the tabulator. It also requires the secretary of state to maintain voting system source code and allows district party chairs to audit that source code at party expense.
If enacted, HB 1587 would have changed the administration of elections by imposing stricter certification, cybersecurity, testing, and audit standards on voting systems and by creating a fallback to manual hand counts when systems do not meet those standards. It would have affected the secretary of state, county auditors, election inspectors, voting system vendors, and political parties with candidates on the ballot. The bill also would have added a new chapter 16.1-15 section making canvasses subject to hand-count requirements when voting systems cannot be used because of security or testing failures.
The available voting history shows the bill was not well supported in the House. It failed on second reading by a wide margin, 10 yeas to 80 nays, indicating broad opposition. Because no committee transcript is provided, there is no recorded floor or committee debate here, but the vote suggests the chamber was generally unconvinced by the proposal’s approach to election security and hand-count requirements.
The main points of contention appear to be the bill’s aggressive decertification and hand-count mandates, which could significantly disrupt election administration. Likely concerns include the practicality and cost of requiring manual counts when systems are deemed noncompliant, the burden of frequent testing and public reporting, and the requirement to make source code available for audit by district party chairs. Supporters would likely frame the bill as an election integrity and cybersecurity measure, while opponents would likely view it as overly restrictive, operationally difficult, and potentially destabilizing for election officials and counties.