House Bill 970 would create a new Article 8 in Chapter 42 of the North Carolina General Statutes to prohibit “algorithmic rent fixing” in the residential rental market. The bill defines a broad set of covered conduct, including software or systems that collect and analyze rental market data from multiple landlords, recommend rents or lease terms, or use nonpublic competitor data to set rent or other commercial terms. It also defines key terms such as pricing algorithm, service provider, nonpublic data, and real estate lessor, and it excludes certain facilities such as inpatient medical care, long-term care, and correctional facilities from the definition of residential dwelling unit.
The bill makes it unlawful for a landlord, or the landlord’s agent or subcontractor, to pay for or subscribe to coordinating functions, and it also prohibits service providers from facilitating agreements among landlords not to compete with respect to residential dwelling units in North Carolina. In effect, the bill targets rent-setting software and related data-sharing arrangements that could be used to coordinate pricing across competing landlords, especially where nonpublic competitor data is involved.
HB970 would treat any violation as an unfair or deceptive trade practice under G.S. 75-1.1, allowing private lawsuits, Chapter 75 remedies, and enforcement by the Attorney General. It also limits the use of pre-dispute arbitration agreements and pre-dispute joint-action waivers in cases alleging violations of the new article, giving tenants or class representatives the option to avoid those provisions in covered disputes. The act would take effect October 1, 2025, and apply only to conduct occurring on or after that date.
The available legislative history shows no recorded committee debate or votes, so there is no formal record of support or opposition in the materials provided. Based on the bill’s structure, the apparent policy goal is consumer protection and antitrust-style regulation of rental pricing tools, suggesting a generally pro-tenant and anti-collusion posture. Because there are no transcripts, the main points of contention can only be inferred: whether the bill is narrowly aimed at anti-competitive rent coordination or whether it could also sweep in legitimate property-management analytics, market research, or pricing services used by landlords.
HB970 would add a new statutory prohibition in Chapter 42 governing residential rental pricing practices and would tie violations to North Carolina’s unfair and deceptive trade practices law in Chapter 75. It would create new civil exposure for landlords, agents, subcontractors, and service providers involved in algorithmic pricing or data-sharing arrangements, while also restricting the enforceability of arbitration clauses and class-action waivers in covered disputes. The bill would therefore affect landlords, rent-setting software vendors, and tenants in the state’s residential housing market.
No committee transcript or vote record is available, so there is no direct evidence of floor or committee sentiment in the provided materials. The bill’s text indicates a strong consumer-protection and anti-collusion approach, likely appealing to supporters concerned about housing affordability and algorithmic coordination. At the same time, the breadth of the definitions suggests potential concern from landlords, property managers, and software vendors about overbreadth and compliance burdens.
The central policy tension is between preventing coordinated rent-setting and preserving ordinary business analytics. Supporters would likely argue that the bill is needed to stop landlords from using shared algorithms or nonpublic competitor data to align rents, while critics may contend that the definitions of “coordinating function,” “pricing algorithm,” and “nonpublic data” are broad enough to capture legitimate pricing tools, market intelligence, or efficiency-enhancing software. Another likely point of contention is the bill’s treatment of arbitration agreements and joint-action waivers, which expands tenant access to court remedies but limits contractual dispute-resolution provisions.