House Bill 707 would prohibit the State of North Carolina and its political subdivisions from purchasing or otherwise acquiring unmanned aircraft, or drones, that are manufactured or assembled by a “covered foreign entity.” The bill defines covered foreign entities to include persons or entities on federal screening lists, entities domiciled in China or Russia, entities controlled by those governments, and subsidiaries or affiliates of such entities. It also bars the use of State funds in connection with such purchases, including funds provided through contracts, grants, or cooperative agreements.
The bill further provides that any contract made in violation of the prohibition is void. The measure would take effect July 1, 2027, and would apply only to unmanned aircraft purchased or acquired on or after that date. The bill would add a new section to Chapter 143 of the General Statutes governing State purchasing and procurement restrictions.
HB707 would create a new procurement restriction in North Carolina law by adding G.S. 143-59.5 to Chapter 143. It would limit State and local government acquisition of drones tied to specified foreign entities, particularly those connected to China or Russia, and would invalidate contracts entered into in violation of the ban. The practical effect would be to steer public agencies toward unmanned aircraft from non-covered vendors and to require review of vendor ownership, control, and federal screening status before purchase.
No committee transcript or recorded vote information was provided, so there is no direct evidence of debate, support, or opposition in the available materials. Based on the bill text alone, the measure appears to reflect a national-security and supply-chain security concern, with an emphasis on restricting government purchases from foreign adversaries or entities associated with them. The absence of recorded discussion makes it difficult to assess the level of consensus or controversy among legislators.
The main point of contention is likely to be the scope of the ban and how “covered foreign entity” is defined, especially the inclusion of entities domiciled in China or Russia and those under their influence or control. Potential concerns may also include implementation burdens for state and local purchasers, the risk of limiting competition or increasing costs, and whether the restriction could affect existing contracts or procurement flexibility. Supporters would likely emphasize security and risk reduction, while critics may focus on procurement impacts and the breadth of the foreign-entity definitions.