Const. Amend. – Gubernatorial Clemency
House Bill 64 proposes a constitutional amendment to change North Carolina’s clemency process by limiting the Governor’s authority to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons. Under the bill, clemency would require concurrence by a majority of the members of each house of the General Assembly, and the votes in both chambers would have to be recorded by yeas and nays. The proposal also states that if clemency is granted while the legislature is adjourned sine die or for more than 30 days, the Governor must reconvene the legislature for consideration; if the Governor does not do so, the clemency grant fails. The bill further clarifies that these terms do not include paroles.
The measure would amend Section 5 of Article III of the North Carolina Constitution, meaning it would alter the Governor’s constitutional powers rather than ordinary statutory law. It also sets out a referendum process: the amendment would be submitted to voters at the statewide general election on November 3, 2026, and would take effect only if approved by a majority of voters and certified by the State Board of Elections. If approved, the Secretary of State would enroll the amendment among the permanent records, and the constitutional change would become effective upon certification.
The bill’s impact would be significant for the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches in North Carolina. It would reduce the Governor’s unilateral clemency authority and give the General Assembly a direct role in approving pardons, commutations, and reprieves. That would affect people seeking clemency, the Governor’s office, the legislature, and the state’s criminal justice and corrections systems, while leaving parole outside the amendment’s scope.
No committee discussion or recorded votes were provided, so there is no documented legislative debate in the materials supplied. Based on the bill text alone, the proposal appears to reflect a strong effort to constrain executive clemency power and shift that authority toward the legislature. Because it is a constitutional amendment, the ultimate decision would rest with voters rather than the legislature alone.
The main point of contention is likely to be separation of powers: supporters may view the change as a check on executive discretion, while opponents may argue that clemency is traditionally an executive function and that requiring legislative approval could make relief too difficult or politicized. Another likely issue is the practical effect of involving both chambers in individual clemency decisions and the possibility of delay or inaction when the legislature is not in session.
H64 would amend the North Carolina Constitution, specifically Article III, Section 5, to condition the Governor’s clemency power on approval by a majority of each house of the General Assembly. It would also require recorded votes in both chambers and create a procedure for reconvening the legislature if clemency is granted during a long adjournment. The bill does not change parole authority, but it would materially alter the process for reprieves, commutations, and pardons and shift power away from the executive branch.
No committee transcripts or votes are available, so there is no recorded debate or legislative sentiment in the provided materials. The bill’s framing suggests a reform-minded, restrictive approach to gubernatorial clemency, likely supported by lawmakers who favor legislative oversight and opposed by those who prefer preserving executive discretion. Because it is a constitutional amendment, public sentiment at the ballot box would ultimately determine whether the change takes effect.
The central contention is whether clemency should remain an executive power or be subject to legislative concurrence. Supporters are likely to argue that requiring approval from both chambers adds accountability and prevents misuse of pardons or commutations, while opponents are likely to argue that it undermines a core constitutional function of the Governor and could politicize individualized mercy decisions. A second issue is the operational burden of requiring legislative action and reconvening the General Assembly when it is not in session, which could delay or effectively block clemency in urgent cases.