ITS; prohibit from contracting with certain entities in mainland China or BIS sanctioned countries.
SB 2834 would amend multiple sections of Mississippi’s information technology procurement laws to bar the Department of Information Technology Services from contracting with business entities that own, operate, or substantially fund facilities or research entities whose primary purpose is software development or artificial intelligence research and development in mainland China or in countries sanctioned by the U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security. The bill adds this written-verification requirement across a broad range of IT and telecommunications procurement provisions, including general IT contracts, telecommunications contracts, equipment support contracts, delegated purchasing arrangements, and wireless communication device vendors.
The measure also reinforces existing procurement and oversight rules for state technology purchases. It preserves competitive bidding and approval requirements, keeps public-purchases-law protections in place, and continues the executive director’s authority over planning, contract review, and agency coordination. For wireless devices, it maintains limits on personal use, reimbursement, vendor approval, and lowest-cost purchasing, while adding the same China/BIS verification requirement for approved vendors. The bill takes effect July 1, 2025.
The bill would amend Sections 25-53-5, 25-53-123, 25-53-109, 25-53-125, 25-53-25, 25-53-121, 25-53-21, and 25-53-191 of the Mississippi Code to add a new contracting restriction tied to foreign ownership, operation, or funding connected to mainland China or BIS-sanctioned countries. In practice, state IT and telecommunications contracts could not be awarded unless the vendor certifies compliance with the new prohibition, and contracts entered in violation of the wireless-device section would be void and unenforceable. The bill would affect the Department of Information Technology Services, state agencies purchasing technology or wireless services, and vendors seeking to do business with the state.
Based on the bill text and available context, the measure appears to be framed as a national-security and procurement-integrity bill rather than a partisan spending or program-expansion measure. The caption and operative language suggest support for restricting state technology contracts from entities with ties to mainland China or BIS-sanctioned countries. No committee transcripts or recorded votes were provided, so there is no direct evidence of debate, amendments, or formal support/opposition in the available materials.
The main point of contention is likely the breadth and enforceability of the foreign-ties restriction, especially the requirement that vendors verify they do not own, operate, or substantially fund relevant facilities or research entities in mainland China or sanctioned countries. Potential concerns could include how vendors would document compliance, whether the restriction could limit competition or raise costs, and how it would apply to complex multinational companies. Another possible issue is the bill’s repeated insertion of the same certification requirement across multiple procurement statutes, which could create administrative burden for the Department of Information Technology Services and affected agencies.