Cyberstalking; authorize injunction when criminal charges filed.
SB 2777 would create a new civil injunction remedy tied to online communications that violate a social media platform’s community standards or policies. If a plaintiff proves by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant’s posts or messages on a platform violate those standards, a court of original jurisdiction would be required to issue an injunction. The court would have discretion over the scope and duration of the order and could direct it at the individual speaker, the social media company hosting or disseminating the content, or, in some cases, a corporate sponsor connected to the speaker or the communication.
The bill also links this injunction process to Mississippi’s cyberstalking law, Section 97-45-15. A court could consider whether criminal charges have been filed under that section when deciding whether a platform-policy violation occurred, and a criminal conviction under that section would be sufficient evidence to support a permanent injunction for the communications at issue. In addition, the bill amends the cyberstalking statute to define “harass” as a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that would seriously alarm, annoy, torment, or terrorize a reasonable person and serves no legitimate purpose.
As drafted, the bill would affect both civil procedure and criminal law in Mississippi. It would add a court-ordered injunction mechanism for certain online speech-related conduct and could expose not only the speaker but also hosting platforms and corporate sponsors to injunctive relief. It also encourages the Supreme Court’s Rules Committee to create a uniform form for implementing the new procedure. The bill takes effect July 1, 2025.
The available context suggests the bill is framed as a cyberstalking measure, but there is no recorded committee debate or vote history in the materials provided, so there is no documented legislative sentiment from hearings or floor action. Based on the text alone, the bill appears aimed at strengthening remedies for harmful online conduct, while also expressly preserving constitutionally protected speech, protest, assembly, and peaceful political activity.
The main point of potential contention is the bill’s reliance on social media companies’ community standards as the trigger for a court injunction, which could raise concerns about private platform rules influencing judicial orders and about the breadth of relief against platforms or sponsors. Another likely issue is the interaction with free-speech protections, since the bill targets communications on social media but includes a savings clause for protected expression. The inclusion of criminal charges and convictions as factors in the civil injunction process may also be debated as an expansion of remedies for cyberstalking and online harassment.
SB 2777 would amend Mississippi law by creating a new injunction procedure in civil court for communications that violate a social media platform’s community standards or policies, and by revising Section 97-45-15 to define “harass” for cyberstalking offenses. It would give courts authority to issue injunctions against the speaker, the hosting platform, or a corporate sponsor, and would make a related criminal conviction sufficient evidence for a permanent injunction. The bill would therefore expand both civil remedies and the practical enforcement tools available in online harassment and cyberstalking cases.
There is no committee transcript or vote record in the provided materials, so no direct legislative sentiment can be measured from debate or roll call. The bill’s caption and text suggest a policy goal of addressing cyberstalking and harmful online conduct, while the inclusion of explicit protections for political speech and constitutionally protected activity indicates an attempt to balance enforcement with free-speech concerns. Overall, the available record shows a proposal focused on stronger remedies, but not a documented public consensus or opposition pattern.
The most notable contention points are likely the bill’s use of social media companies’ own policies as the legal benchmark for injunctions, the possibility of enjoining platforms and corporate sponsors in addition to the individual defendant, and the use of criminal charges or convictions to support civil relief. Critics may view those features as overbroad or as giving private platform rules too much influence over court orders, while supporters may see them as necessary tools to curb cyberstalking and online harassment. The bill’s express carve-out for peaceful political expression and constitutionally protected speech suggests lawmakers anticipated First Amendment concerns.