SF 1240 establishes a new set of “neurodata” and neurotechnology rights in Minnesota law. It creates a right to mental privacy, barring government entities from collecting data directly transcribed from brain activity without informed consent, and a right to cognitive liberty, limiting government interference with an individual’s decision-making in neurotechnology contexts. The bill also defines key terms such as brain-computer interface, consciousness bypass, and neurotechnology, and creates individual rights to change neurotechnology decisions, mental integrity, and psychological continuity.
The bill imposes consent and disclosure requirements on companies that collect or store data through brain-computer interfaces. Each time a person connects to such a device, the company must disclose intended uses of the data and any third parties with whom it will be shared, and must obtain separate consent for each use and each third party before use or sharing. It also prohibits companies from using a brain-computer interface to bypass a person’s conscious decision-making, except where an individual gives informed consent before a medical procedure designed to do so. Violations of these provisions are subject to civil enforcement by the attorney general and a penalty of up to $10,000 per incident.
The bill also amends Minnesota’s computer damage and computer access crimes to account for systems involving brain-computer interfaces. Damaging a computer that has a brain-computer interface would be treated as a more serious offense regardless of the dollar value of the loss, and unauthorized access to a system that includes a brain-computer interface would be elevated to gross misdemeanor status. These criminal-law changes are effective for crimes committed on or after August 1, 2025.
The overall sentiment reflected in the available record is limited but appears generally supportive of the concept, as shown by the bill’s introduction under the caption “Neurodata rights establishment” and its framing around privacy and personal autonomy. No committee transcript or vote record is provided, so there is no documented debate, amendment activity, or recorded opposition in the materials supplied.
The main points of potential contention are likely to center on how broadly the new rights apply, how companies can comply with repeated consent requirements, and whether the bill’s restrictions on brain-computer interfaces could affect medical research, clinical treatment, or emerging neurotechnology products. Questions may also arise about enforcement standards, the scope of “informed consent,” and whether the criminal-law enhancements are appropriately tailored to the risks posed by neurotechnology systems.
The bill would add a new neurotechnology privacy and rights framework to Minnesota law, including a new section in chapter 325E and a new subdivision in the government data practices law. It would also amend existing criminal statutes on computer damage and unauthorized computer access to specifically address brain-computer interface systems, increasing penalties for offenses involving those systems and creating new gross misdemeanor treatment for unauthorized access to them. The attorney general would gain express authority to enforce the civil penalty provisions against companies that violate the consent or consciousness-bypass rules.
Based on the bill text and the limited legislative record provided, the measure appears to be framed positively around privacy, autonomy, and protection from emerging neurotechnology risks. There are no committee transcripts or votes available to show formal support or opposition, but the bill’s structure suggests an intent to protect consumers and patients rather than to regulate for punitive purposes alone. Any sentiment assessment beyond that is necessarily limited by the absence of recorded debate.
Likely areas of contention include the breadth of the new mental privacy and cognitive liberty rights, the feasibility of obtaining separate consent for each data use and third party, and the prohibition on using a brain-computer interface to bypass conscious decision-making. Technology companies may view the compliance obligations and civil penalties as burdensome, while medical and research stakeholders may be concerned about how the “consciousness bypass” language could affect legitimate clinical procedures. Law enforcement and prosecutors may also scrutinize the enhanced criminal penalties tied to brain-computer interface systems and whether those penalties are proportionate.