Government entities prohibited from requesting or obtaining reverse-location information, uses of reverse-location data by various entities prohibited, and civil cause of action provided when data is obtained by a government entity.
HF103 would create a new Minnesota law restricting government access to “reverse-location” and “reverse-keyword” data. In practical terms, it bars state and local government entities from asking courts for geofence-style location orders or keyword/search-history orders, from making voluntary requests for that information, and from using or obtaining such data through other governments or federal agencies when Minnesota officials would be prohibited from seeking it directly. It also prohibits Minnesota courts from issuing or enforcing these orders, except in a defined “sudden emergency.”
The bill defines reverse-location data as information that can identify unspecified devices or users present in a geographic area at a given time, and reverse-keyword data as information identifying unnamed people who searched for a particular term, phrase, or website or who visited a website through a search-generated link. It further limits the use of evidence obtained in violation of the bill by making that evidence, and evidence derived from it, inadmissible in criminal, civil, administrative, or other proceedings, subject to the bill’s own enforcement provisions.
HF103 would also create a civil remedy for people whose identifying information is obtained in violation of the law. Affected individuals would have to be notified in writing and could sue the government entity for statutory damages or actual damages, punitive damages, injunctive or declaratory relief, attorney fees, and other relief the court finds appropriate. The bill proposes to add these provisions to Minnesota Statutes, chapter 626A, which governs electronic communications privacy.
The general sentiment reflected by the bill text is strongly privacy-protective and restrictive of government surveillance tools. No committee transcript or vote record is provided, so there is no recorded debate or vote-based indication of support or opposition in the materials supplied. Based on the structure of the bill, its policy aim is to limit broad digital dragnet searches and to protect bystanders and unnamed users from being swept into investigations.
The main points of contention likely concern law-enforcement access and emergency exceptions. The bill allows an exception only for a declared “sudden emergency,” and it also bars Minnesota courts from honoring similar orders from other states, which could raise concerns about investigative flexibility, interstate cooperation, and the ability to respond to serious crimes or urgent public-safety situations. Supporters would likely emphasize privacy, due process, and limits on overbroad digital searches, while critics may argue the bill could impede investigations that rely on location or search data.
HF103 would add a new chapter 626A restriction on government use of reverse-location and reverse-keyword surveillance methods, directly affecting state and local law enforcement, prosecutors, courts, and other government entities in Minnesota. It would prohibit seeking, obtaining, or using geofence-style location data and keyword/search-history data, block Minnesota courts from issuing or enforcing such orders except during a sudden emergency, exclude unlawfully obtained or derived evidence from proceedings, and create a private right of action with damages and attorney-fee remedies for affected individuals.
The bill appears to be driven by a strong privacy and civil-liberties sentiment, aiming to curb broad digital surveillance and protect unnamed individuals from being identified through reverse-location or reverse-keyword searches. Because there are no committee transcripts or votes included, the available record does not show formal legislative debate or measured support/opposition, but the bill’s design suggests a clear pro-privacy posture. Any opposition would likely center on concerns about restricting investigative tools and limiting court-authorized access in criminal and emergency contexts.
The likely contention is between privacy advocates and law-enforcement/public-safety interests. Supporters would favor the bill’s limits on geofence warrants, keyword warrants, and cross-state enforcement because these tools can capture data on many innocent people. Opponents may object that the bill is too broad, especially its ban on court orders and voluntary requests, its exclusion of evidence, and its refusal to honor similar orders from other states, arguing that these restrictions could hinder investigations, especially outside the narrow “sudden emergency” exception.