AN ACT relating to the use of algorithmic devices in setting the amount of rent to be charged to a residential tenant.
Summary
HB358 would prohibit landlords from using or relying on “algorithmic devices” when setting rent for residential dwelling units. The bill defines an algorithmic device broadly as a tool or product that uses one or more algorithms to analyze rent and related data to advise a landlord on what rent to charge, while excluding products designed internally and used only by a landlord or its affiliates. The measure is aimed at software and pricing tools that aggregate market data and recommend rents.
The bill also states that a violation of this prohibition would be treated as an unfair, false, misleading, or deceptive trade practice under Kentucky’s consumer protection law, KRS 367.170. It applies only to rental agreements executed on or after the bill’s effective date, so it would govern future rent-setting decisions rather than retroactively affecting existing leases.
Impact
HB358 would add a new section to KRS Chapter 383 and create a state-level restriction on the use of rent-setting software by landlords. It would also connect violations to Kentucky’s existing consumer protection enforcement framework by classifying noncompliance as an unfair, false, misleading, or deceptive practice under KRS 367.170. The practical effect would be to limit landlords’ use of third-party pricing algorithms and potentially expose violators to enforcement under trade-practice law.
Sentiment
The bill’s stated purpose and findings reflect a strongly supportive posture toward restricting algorithmic rent-setting, framing the practice as a source of collusion, price fixing, and higher rents for tenants. The available record contains no committee transcript or vote history, so there is no direct evidence of debate, amendments, or recorded opposition in the materials provided. Based on the bill text alone, the sentiment is clearly tenant-protective and anti-collusion.
Contention
The main point of contention is likely to be whether algorithmic pricing tools facilitate anticompetitive conduct or instead serve as legitimate market-analysis software for landlords. Another likely issue is the breadth of the definition of “algorithmic device,” including whether it could sweep in common property-management software or pricing analytics, and whether the exemption for internally designed tools is sufficiently clear. Landlords, software vendors, and housing industry groups would likely favor a narrower reading or oppose the restriction, while tenant advocates and antitrust proponents would likely support it.