Prohibiting the acquisition of critical components of drone technology from countries of concern and the procurement of final or finished goods or services from countries of concern.
HB 2293 would restrict Kansas governmental agencies and state agencies from buying drones, drone-related services, maintenance, equipment, or other final goods and services when the critical components or the vendor are tied to designated foreign adversaries. The bill defines “countries of concern” to include China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, and Venezuela, and it broadly defines “foreign principal” to capture governments, political parties, entities organized or principally based in those countries, and certain individuals or controlled entities. It also defines “critical component” to include key drone parts and software used to record, store, or transmit data.
The bill creates a general prohibition on acquiring drone technology whose critical components were produced in a country of concern or produced or owned by a foreign principal. It also bars state agencies from contracting for final or finished goods or services from a foreign principal unless the entity has already cleared federal national-security review under the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) or has an existing national security agreement with CFIUS or the U.S. Department of Defense. Existing contracts entered into before July 1, 2025, are grandfathered, and previously acquired noncompliant drone components may continue to be used until replacement is needed, subject to limits on future replacement purchases.
The bill would affect Kansas procurement law by adding new restrictions on state and local governmental purchasing, layered on top of existing state purchasing statutes. It would require agencies to screen drone purchases and other contracts for foreign ownership, foreign control, and country-of-origin concerns, and it gives the secretary of administration, after consulting with the adjutant general, authority to approve otherwise prohibited acquisitions when no reasonable alternative exists and the acquisition is necessary for safety and security. In practical terms, the measure would likely push agencies toward U.S.-based or allied suppliers and away from vendors with ties to the listed countries.
Because there were no committee transcripts or recorded votes provided, the available context does not show direct debate or formal opposition/support. Based on the bill’s structure and caption, the measure appears to be framed as a national-security and supply-chain protection bill, with an emphasis on limiting foreign influence in sensitive technology procurement. The inclusion of an emergency-style safety exception suggests an intent to preserve flexibility for agencies that cannot readily source compliant equipment.
The main points of contention likely center on how broadly “foreign principal” and “critical component” are defined, whether the restrictions could limit competition or raise procurement costs, and how agencies would verify compliance in complex supply chains. Another likely issue is the balance between security concerns and operational needs, especially for drones and related services used by public safety, infrastructure, and other governmental functions.
HB 2293 would amend Kansas procurement practices by prohibiting governmental agencies and state agencies from purchasing drones, drone components, related services, or finished goods and services from specified foreign-linked sources, subject to narrow exceptions. It would create new statutory definitions for countries of concern, foreign principals, drones, critical components, and related terms, and it would authorize limited waivers through the secretary of administration with adjutant general consultation when necessary for safety and security. Existing contracts before July 1, 2025, would not be affected, and previously acquired noncompliant components could continue in use under specified conditions.
No committee testimony or vote record was provided, so there is no documented legislative sentiment to summarize from the available materials. The bill’s caption and text indicate a generally security-focused, anti-foreign-adversary posture, suggesting support would likely come from members prioritizing supply-chain security and resistance to procurement from countries of concern. Any opposition would likely stem from concerns about procurement flexibility, cost, implementation burdens, and the breadth of the restrictions.
The likely areas of contention are the breadth of the prohibitions and the definitions used to implement them. Critics may question whether the bill’s definitions of “foreign principal” and “critical component” are too expansive, potentially capturing ordinary commercial supply chains or limiting access to needed technology. Supporters are likely to emphasize national security, protection of sensitive data, and reducing dependence on adversarial countries. Another possible point of debate is the waiver process, which gives the secretary of administration and the adjutant general discretion to approve otherwise prohibited acquisitions when no reasonable alternative exists and the security need outweighs the risk.