HB2873 amends the Illinois Stalking No Contact Order Act by expanding and clarifying the statutory definition of “stalking” and related terms. The bill adds that stalking includes harassment that is not necessary to accomplish a reasonable purpose, would cause a reasonable person emotional distress, and does cause emotional distress to the petitioner. It also expands the definition of “course of conduct” and “contact” to expressly cover electronic communications, electronic tracking, surveillance, repeated unwanted contact, and conduct directed at workplaces, schools, places of worship, homes, vehicles, and other occupied property.
The bill also creates a rebuttable presumption that certain conduct causes emotional distress, including disturbing the petitioner’s workplace or school, repeated unwanted calls, repeated following, surveillance outside a home or workplace, threats to a minor child or family member, and threats of physical force, confinement, or restraint. In addition, it clarifies that a petitioner may include authorized agents of a workplace, school, or place of worship, and it updates the definition of a stalking no contact order to include remedies authorized elsewhere in the Act. The measure takes effect immediately upon becoming law.
HB2873 changes Section 10 of the Stalking No Contact Order Act, broadening the conduct that can support a stalking no contact order and making it easier for petitioners to establish emotional distress in specified situations. It affects how courts, petitioners, and respondents evaluate stalking allegations, especially where the conduct involves electronic communications, tracking technology, repeated surveillance, or harassment at work, school, or places of worship. The bill also expressly preserves lawful speech and assembly, including labor-related activity and lawful picketing arising from bona fide labor disputes.
The bill appears to have been broadly supported and noncontroversial in recorded votes, passing the House 106-0 and a Senate motion 57-0. The unanimous margins suggest strong bipartisan agreement on the need to strengthen stalking protections and clarify the law’s application to modern forms of harassment and surveillance. No committee transcript was provided, so the available record shows consensus rather than detailed debate.
The main potential point of contention is the bill’s expansion of what counts as stalking, particularly the new harassment language and the rebuttable presumption that certain behaviors cause emotional distress. Those changes could raise concerns about overbreadth or proof standards in close cases. The bill addresses one likely area of concern by carving out lawful free speech, assembly, labor compliance activity, and bona fide labor picketing, indicating attention to protecting labor and First Amendment-related activity from being swept into the stalking definition.