An act to amend Section 1546.1 Sections 1546.1 and 1546.4 of the Penal Code, relating to criminal procedure.
AB 358 would amend California’s Electronic Communications Privacy Act to create a new exception allowing law enforcement or other government entities to access electronic device information when an individual finds a tracking or surveillance device in their residence, vehicle, or personal property and gives specific consent, and the device is reasonably believed to have been used to track or record them without permission. The bill defines a tracking or surveillance device as an electronic device whose sole purpose is to record audio or visual information or to permit tracking of a person. It also requires the government entity to seek judicial review within three court days after obtaining information under this exception, using a process similar to the existing emergency-disclosure procedure, and mandates destruction of the information if the facts do not support the claimed circumstances.
The bill also revises the remedy provisions in Penal Code Section 1546.4. It broadens who may petition a court to void or modify a warrant, order, legal process, request, or demand, and to seek destruction of information obtained in violation of the chapter or constitutional protections. The revised language is intended to make the statute more explicit that individuals can challenge not only warrants and orders, but also other forms of legal process or demands seeking their electronic information.
In practical terms, AB 358 would modestly expand the circumstances under which government entities may access electronic device information without first obtaining a warrant, but only in a narrow anti-stalking/anti-surveillance scenario tied to the consent of the person who discovered the device. It would also reinforce post-access judicial oversight, destruction requirements, and notification rules, while leaving the broader warrant, wiretap, subpoena, and emergency frameworks in place. The bill primarily affects Penal Code sections 1546.1 and 1546.4 and would be part of California’s digital privacy and criminal procedure law.
The overall sentiment reflected in the vote history is strongly favorable. The bill advanced through committee and the Assembly with unanimous or near-unanimous support at each recorded committee stage, and it passed the Assembly 63-1. That pattern suggests broad agreement with the bill’s privacy-protective purpose and its limited, targeted exception for suspected hidden tracking devices.
The main point of contention appears to be the balance between privacy and investigative authority, though the available record shows little overt opposition. The most likely concern is whether the new consent-based access exception could be used too broadly or whether the definition of a tracking or surveillance device is sufficiently precise. The bill’s later placement on the suspense file indicates fiscal or policy review remained unresolved in the Senate appropriations process, even though the substantive policy itself appears to have drawn little resistance.
AB 358 would amend Penal Code Section 1546.1 to add a new exception to California’s electronic device privacy rules, allowing access to device information when a person discovers a suspected hidden tracking or surveillance device on their property and consents to government access. It would also amend Section 1546.4 to expand and clarify the ability of affected individuals and recipients of process to petition courts to void or modify unlawful warrants, orders, requests, or demands and to seek destruction of unlawfully obtained information. The bill would not repeal the existing warrant, wiretap, subpoena, emergency, or consent rules, but would add a narrow new access pathway and strengthen judicial review and suppression remedies.
The bill appears to have enjoyed broad bipartisan or near-unanimous support in the Assembly and committees, with recorded votes showing no opposition until the Assembly floor vote, where it passed overwhelmingly 63-1. The absence of committee transcript controversy and the bill’s repeated “do pass” recommendations suggest that legislators generally viewed it as a targeted privacy and anti-stalking measure rather than a major expansion of surveillance authority. Its later suspense-file placement indicates that any remaining concerns were likely procedural, fiscal, or related to appropriations rather than the core policy.
The principal policy tension is between protecting victims of covert tracking and preserving limits on government access to electronic data. Supporters likely view the bill as a practical tool for people who discover hidden trackers in cars, homes, or personal property, while any skeptics may worry about the breadth of the consent exception, the definition of a tracking or surveillance device, or whether the new process could be used to justify access without a warrant in edge cases. The bill’s requirement for prompt court review and destruction of information if the facts are not supported appears designed to address those concerns.