voting; equipment; internet; custody; violation
SB1037 would tighten Arizona election-security rules for voting systems, polling-place equipment, central counting-center equipment, and election management systems. The bill amends existing certification law to require that approved voting systems comply with federal HAVA requirements and be tested by accredited labs, and it directs the secretary of state to adopt standards for loss of certification and to retain authority to revoke or prohibit use of systems that include uncertified hardware, firmware, or software. It also adds a new requirement that approved electronic voting systems not have hardware supporting direct or indirect internet connectivity, not allow remote access or result changes through files or databases, use unique user credentials that change at least once per election cycle, log deletions and software activity, and preserve specified logs for 22 months.
The bill further creates separate custody and security rules for equipment used at polling places and at counting centers. Polling-place equipment could not have internet access or access to aggregated data or results, and any accessible port would have to be sealed and tracked in chain-of-custody records. Counting-center or tabulation equipment would be barred from internet access and indirect internet connectivity, would have to prevent access to data or results until used by authorized personnel, and would not be allowed to have a port. The bill also requires nonstop video of counting-center activities to be posted on the county website and makes violations class 1 misdemeanors, with negligent violations specifically covered for counting-center equipment.
In practical terms, SB1037 would have expanded state election-law restrictions on voting technology and imposed more detailed operational, logging, and chain-of-custody requirements on counties, cities, towns, and election officials. It would have affected the secretary of state’s certification process, local election administrators, vendors of voting systems, and personnel handling equipment at polling places and counting centers. The bill also defines “indirect internet connectivity” to include use of an election management system gateway system, which is a key policy point in the measure.
The general sentiment reflected in the vote history suggests the bill had meaningful support among Republicans and enough backing to pass both chambers, but it also faced clear opposition and was not broadly bipartisan. It passed the Senate 16-11 and the House 31-20, after a failed House committee vote and later reconsideration or substitute action that moved it forward. The final action was a veto, indicating that despite legislative approval, the governor did not accept the measure.
The main point of contention appears to have been the bill’s sweeping prohibition on direct and indirect internet connectivity for election systems, especially the explicit rejection of EMS gateway systems. Supporters framed the bill as a response to election-security risks and alleged vulnerabilities in current practices, while opponents likely viewed it as overly restrictive, operationally burdensome, or based on disputed claims about existing systems and security threats. The bill’s legislative findings also show a strong partisan and security-focused rationale, including criticism of the secretary of state’s authority and references to hacking concerns.
SB1037 would have amended Arizona election statutes in Title 16 to impose stricter certification, security, custody, logging, and monitoring requirements on voting systems and election management systems. It would have added new criminal penalties for violations, required chain-of-custody documentation and video recording at counting centers, and limited the use of systems with any direct or indirect internet connectivity, including EMS gateway systems. The measure would have significantly affected the secretary of state, county election officials, municipalities, vendors, and others involved in election equipment procurement, certification, and operation.
The bill appears to have been supported by a majority in both chambers but remained politically divisive. Committee and floor votes show Republican-led advancement with some opposition, and the measure ultimately passed both the Senate and House before being vetoed. The overall tone of the bill text is strongly security-oriented and skeptical of connected election systems, suggesting supporters viewed it as a necessary safeguard against hacking and unauthorized access, while the voting pattern indicates substantial resistance from the minority party and likely from officials concerned about implementation or necessity.
The central controversy was whether election systems should be allowed to have any direct or indirect internet connectivity, with the bill expressly banning EMS gateway systems and requiring offline-only operation. Another major point of contention was the bill’s operational burden: sealed ports, detailed chain-of-custody logs, 22-month retention requirements, nonstop public video at counting centers, and misdemeanor penalties for violations. The legislative findings also signal conflict with the secretary of state over authority to approve or permit connected systems, and the bill’s references to hacking and foreign actors suggest supporters framed the issue as an urgent security threat while critics likely questioned both the factual basis and the practicality of the restrictions.