HB 113 would restrict a political subdivision’s ability to ask voters again for approval of the same general obligation bond purpose after voters have already rejected that purpose within the previous five years. In practical terms, if a city, county, school district, or other political subdivision loses a bond election on a particular project or financing purpose, it could not place the same purpose back on the ballot for another vote until five years have passed.
The bill amends Chapter 1253 of the Texas Government Code by adding a new section that creates this five-year waiting period. The restriction applies only to propositions submitted in elections ordered on or after the bill’s effective date, so it would not retroactively affect earlier bond elections. The bill also includes a standard effective-date clause allowing it to take effect immediately if it receives the constitutionally required two-thirds vote in each chamber, or otherwise on the 91st day after the legislative session ends.
Impact
HB 113 would change state law by limiting the ballot access of political subdivisions for general obligation bond propositions tied to the same rejected purpose. It would not change the substantive authority to issue bonds, but it would delay repeated voter submissions and reduce the frequency with which local governments can re-ask voters to approve the same financing proposal after a defeat. The affected parties would be local governments and, indirectly, voters who would see fewer repeated bond elections on the same issue.
Sentiment
No committee transcript or vote history was provided, so there is no recorded discussion or roll-call evidence of support or opposition in the materials supplied. Based on the bill text alone, the measure appears designed to protect voter decisions and limit repeated ballot measures, which suggests a reform-oriented, voter-protection rationale. However, without hearing records, the overall sentiment cannot be assessed beyond the bill’s apparent purpose.
Contention
The main point of contention likely would be between local governments that want flexibility to re-submit bond proposals and voters or fiscal watchdogs who may prefer a cooling-off period after a rejection. Supporters would likely argue that repeated bond elections can pressure voters and waste election resources, while opponents could argue that circumstances may change quickly and local needs should not be blocked for five years after a single defeat. No specific objections or supporters are identified in the provided record.
Relating to the authority of a political subdivision to propose for voter approval the issuance of general obligation bonds for a purpose rejected by voters at a bond election held during the preceding five years.
Relating to the authority of a political subdivision to propose for voter approval the issuance of general obligation bonds for a purpose rejected by voters at a bond election held during the preceding two years.
Relating to the authority of a political subdivision to propose for voter approval the issuance of general obligation bonds for a purpose rejected by voters at a bond election held during the preceding two years.
Relating to the authority of a political subdivision to propose for voter approval the issuance of general obligation bonds for a purpose rejected by voters at a bond election held during the preceding five years.
Relating to the authority of a political subdivision to propose for voter approval the issuance of general obligation bonds for a purpose rejected by voters at a bond election held during the preceding five years.
Relating to the issuance and repayment of debt by local governments, including the adoption of an ad valorem tax rate and the use of ad valorem tax revenue for the repayment of debt.