Relating to a prohibition on governmental contracts with companies of foreign adversaries for certain information and communications technology; authorizing a civil penalty; creating a criminal offense.
SB 1585 would expand Texas law governing state and local contracting to bar governmental entities from entering into contracts for certain information and communications technology or services with companies tied to foreign adversaries or otherwise identified as security risks. The bill creates a new subchapter in Chapter 2275 of the Government Code focused specifically on information and communications technology, while retaining the existing framework for contracts involving critical infrastructure. It defines key terms such as “foreign adversary,” “scrutinized company,” and “information or communications technology or service,” and requires vendors bidding on covered contracts to certify that they are not scrutinized companies and will not use such companies in performing the contract.
The bill also establishes a process for determining whether a vendor made a false verification, including notice, an opportunity to respond, and a final determination by the governmental entity. If a violation is confirmed, the contract must be terminated, the vendor is barred from state contracts for five years, and the comptroller must debar the vendor from participating in state contracts for the same period. SB 1585 further authorizes the attorney general to seek a civil penalty equal to the greater of twice the terminated contract amount or the state’s losses, plus attorney’s fees and costs, and makes a violation a state jail felony.
In practical terms, the bill would affect state agencies, political subdivisions, and certain utility-related entities that procure covered technology or services, as well as vendors in the information and communications technology supply chain. It would likely require more extensive vendor screening, contract certifications, and compliance review for technology procurements, especially where products or services may involve companies linked to China or other countries identified through federal export-control or national-security lists. The bill applies only to solicitations made public on or after its effective date, September 1, 2025.
The overall sentiment reflected in the available record is limited, but the bill’s structure and subject matter suggest a strong security-focused approach and an intent to reduce state exposure to foreign-controlled technology providers. The voting history provided does not show substantive opposition or support counts beyond procedural entries, and no committee transcript excerpts were included. The main point of contention inherent in the bill is the balance between national-security concerns and procurement practicality: the bill allows exceptions only when no non-scrutinized vendors are available, when alternatives are overwhelmingly cost-prohibitive, or when the foreign-origin component is de minimis and poses no security risk. Those exceptions indicate likely concern about cost, vendor availability, and implementation burden for governmental entities and contractors.
SB 1585 would amend Chapter 2275, Government Code, by adding a new subchapter that prohibits governmental entities from contracting for covered information and communications technology or services with scrutinized companies and companies associated with foreign adversaries. It would also expand the existing critical-infrastructure contracting restrictions by clarifying definitions and the governor’s authority to designate countries as threats. The bill creates new compliance obligations for bidders, new enforcement mechanisms for governmental entities and the comptroller, and new civil and criminal penalties for violations, including debarment and a state jail felony offense.
The available record suggests the bill is driven by national-security and supply-chain-security concerns, with a generally restrictive posture toward foreign-linked technology vendors. Because no committee transcript excerpts are provided and the vote entries are procedural rather than substantive, there is little direct evidence of debate in the record supplied. The presence of narrow exceptions, however, indicates an effort to address practical procurement concerns while maintaining a strong security standard.
The likely points of contention are whether the bill is too broad in excluding vendors connected to foreign adversaries, how difficult it will be for agencies and contractors to verify compliance, and whether the cost of replacing existing vendors could be excessive. The bill’s exceptions for sole-source availability, disproportionate cost, and de minimis foreign-origin components appear designed to address those concerns. Potentially affected parties include state agencies, political subdivisions, ERCOT-related entities, technology vendors, and companies with ownership or supply-chain ties to China or other federally identified countries.