Proposing a constitutional amendment to limit the authority of the governor to veto a bill passed by both houses of the Texas Legislature with a vote of at least two-thirds of the members of each house.
Impact
If enacted, SJR38 would amend Section 14 of Article IV of the Texas Constitution. This change would especially impact the operational dynamics between the legislative and executive branches of government in Texas, allowing legislation that shows a strong consensus among lawmakers to take effect without the governor's approval. Proponents of the amendment argue that it would prevent the governor from unilaterally opposing widely supported legislative measures, fostering a more cooperative governance model that reflects the will of a larger segment of the legislature and, by extension, the electorate.
Summary
SJR38 is a joint resolution proposing a constitutional amendment that seeks to limit the authority of the governor of Texas to veto bills that have been passed by a two-thirds majority in both houses of the Texas Legislature. Under the current law, the governor has the power to disapprove legislation; however, this bill would allow bills to become law even if the governor opposes them, provided they have substantial bipartisan support. The goal of SJR38 is to enhance legislative independence and reduce the power of the executive branch in the lawmaking process.
Conclusion
The proposed amendment will be put to a public vote on November 4, 2025, allowing citizens to decide on the potential shift in legislative authority. The discussion around SJR38 exemplifies broader debates concerning the distribution of powers among state institutions and the importance of representative democracy in shaping governance in Texas.
Contention
There are points of contention surrounding SJR38, particularly regarding the balance of power between the governor's office and the legislature. Critics might argue that this proposed amendment could undermine the check-and-balance system intended by the framers of the state constitution. They may express concern that reducing the governor's veto power could lead to the passage of legislation that does not adequately consider executive insights or input, thus fostering a legislative environment that operates outside of the executive's oversight.
Proposing a constitutional amendment requiring the governor to call the legislature into special session on petition of at least two-thirds of the members of each house of the legislature.
Proposing a constitutional amendment changing the vote requirement in the legislature to approve a proposed constitutional amendment for submission to the voters of this state to two-thirds of the members present in each chamber of the legislature.
Proposing a constitutional amendment requiring consent by two-thirds of the members of the house of representatives and senate for the governor to call more than one special session per legislative biennium.
This joint resolution proposes constitutional amendments that (1) authorize the President to reduce or disapprove any appropriation in a bill or joint resolution using a line-item veto; (2) prohibit Members of Congress from serving more than six terms in the House of Representatives or two terms in the Senate; and (3) prohibit a chamber of Congress from agreeing to legislation that imposes, authorizes, or raises any tax or fee unless the legislation contains no other subject and is agreed to by an affirmative vote of at least two-thirds of the chamber.
Proposing a constitutional amendment to require that future constitutional amendments become effective only if approved by a majority of the voters in at least three-fourths of the counties of the state.
A resolution to direct the Clerk of the House of Representatives to only present to the Governor enrolled House bills finally passed by both houses of the One Hundred Third Legislature.
Relates to the line of succession for the governor and lieutenant-governor in cases where they are impeached or unable to perform the duties of the office.
Relates to the line of succession for the governor and lieutenant-governor in cases where they are impeached or unable to perform the duties of the office.