Securing Semiconductor Supply Chains Act
SB97, titled the Securing Semiconductor Supply Chains Act, directs the Department of Commerce’s SelectUSA program to work more closely with state-level economic development organizations to attract foreign direct investment into semiconductor-related manufacturing and production. The bill is focused on strengthening domestic capacity in vulnerable parts of the semiconductor supply chain, including fabrication, advanced packaging, and the materials and equipment used to make chips.
The legislation requires SelectUSA, within 180 days of enactment, to solicit input from state economic development organizations about federal actions that could support more investment, barriers to investment, opportunities to attract investment, and resource gaps that limit state efforts. It also asks for recommendations on how SelectUSA can increase investment directly or in partnership with states, while ensuring that efforts with allied or partner countries do not benefit foreign adversaries. Within two years, SelectUSA must report to Congress on the comments received, its ongoing activities, and strategies to further increase semiconductor-related investment and secure the supply chain.
The bill does not create a new grant program or regulatory regime, and it expressly provides that no additional funds are authorized. Instead, it changes federal coordination and reporting expectations for SelectUSA, requiring the program to use existing resources to consult with states and report to Congress. Its practical effect would be to formalize federal-state collaboration around semiconductor investment promotion and potentially shape future economic development and supply-chain policy without directly amending tax, trade, or industrial policy statutes.
The bill appears broadly favorable and noncontroversial in concept, reflecting bipartisan concern about semiconductor shortages, supply-chain resilience, and national security. The findings emphasize economic recovery, domestic manufacturing, and reducing vulnerability to foreign disruption, suggesting a policy consensus around encouraging chip-related investment in the United States. The available record shows the bill passed the Senate on May 20, 2025, and there are no recorded committee transcripts or votes indicating significant opposition.
The main policy tension in the bill is not whether to support semiconductor investment, but how to do so and with whom. The bill specifically instructs SelectUSA to consider barriers to investment, resource gaps at the state level, and how to work with allies and partners so that foreign adversaries do not benefit from U.S. efforts. That language suggests concern about national security screening, geopolitical risk, and the possibility that foreign investment promotion could inadvertently aid adversarial countries. Another possible point of concern is that the bill imposes new coordination and reporting duties without additional funding, which could be seen as limiting implementation capacity for SelectUSA and state partners.